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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 1 actor

Gholoader

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Indrik Spider

Typically, a TA569 attack chain consists of three parts: the malicious SocGholish injects served to website visitors; a traffic distribution service (TDS) responsible for determining which user receives which payload based on a variety of filtering options; and the ultimate payload, GhoLoader.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence3

The SocGholish JavaScript-based malware downloader (also tracked as FakeUpdates and GhoLoader) has been used in attacks since at least 2017, and it works by hijacking legitimate websites (primarily WordPress sites) and tricking visitors into downloading malicious payloads, commonly disguised as fake browser updates.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

From Proofpoint’s visibility, we see legitimate email traffic that contain URLs that link to compromised websites. The compromised domains redirect traffic to actor-controlled domains to deliver a malicious payload.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

The downloaded file is GhoLoader Stage 1 — a WSH JScript that POSTs to its C2 via “ActiveXObject('MSXML2.XMLHTTP')” and executes the response.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

When a user installs the malicious update, the malware opens a connection to the attackers, giving them access to the infected system.

Persistence

1 technique
T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence1

Typically, a TA569 attack chain consists of three parts: the malicious SocGholish injects served to website visitors; a traffic distribution service (TDS) responsible for determining which user receives which payload based on a variety of filtering options...

Stealth

2 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

...tricking visitors into downloading malicious payloads, commonly disguised as fake browser updates.

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence1

Typically, a TA569 attack chain consists of three parts: the malicious SocGholish injects served to website visitors; a traffic distribution service (TDS) responsible for determining which user receives which payload based on a variety of filtering options...

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The downloaded file is GhoLoader Stage 1 — a WSH JScript that POSTs to its C2 via “ActiveXObject('MSXML2.XMLHTTP')” and executes the response.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

That iframe fetches a script from the TA569 C2 which contains the file "Google Launcher.js" (GhoLoader Stage 1, C2: “js-new[.]newtoyourgame[.]com”) as an embedded base64 blob... and triggers the download.

T1205Traffic SignalingEvidence1

Typically, a TA569 attack chain consists of three parts: the malicious SocGholish injects served to website visitors; a traffic distribution service (TDS) responsible for determining which user receives which payload based on a variety of filtering options...

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
2 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in apptoday
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ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

2 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

2 SOURCESView more in app
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
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IOC matching2

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping8

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.