MalwareUsed by 1 actor

DLL-test

For your environment

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Aoqin Dragon

The DLL-test.dll loader is notable because it is used to initiate the infection chain.

via sentinelone labssentinelone.com

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

3 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Persistence

1 technique

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

The malware sets the auto start function with the value “EverNoteTrayUService”. When the user restarts the computer, it will execute the “Evernote Tray Application” and use DLL hijacking to load the malicious loader.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

After decrypting the encrypted payload, DLL-test.dll will execute rundll32.exe and run specific export functions. The loader injects the decrypted payload into memory and runs it persistently.

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

There are two payloads in this attack chain... the second one is an encrypted backdoor which injects itself into rundll32’s memory.

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

Stealth

2 techniques

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

After decrypting the encrypted payload, DLL-test.dll will execute rundll32.exe and run specific export functions. The loader injects the decrypted payload into memory and runs it persistently.

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

There are two payloads in this attack chain... the second one is an encrypted backdoor which injects itself into rundll32’s memory.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Hashes

8 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting

hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app9 months ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

sentinelone labsNews

Oct 9, 2025

Aoqin Dragon | Newly-Discovered Chinese-linked APT Has Been Quietly Spying On Organizations For 10 Years | SentinelOne

A loader used to start the infection chain via DLL hijacking. It copies modules from removable media, establishes persistence via EverNoteTrayService, decrypts payloads, launches rundll32.exe, and injects backdoor payloads such as Mongall or the modified Heyoka backdoor into memory.

What this page doesn’t show

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IOC matching8

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping3

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.