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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

SmashJacker

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For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Charcoal Stork

The emergence of SmashJacker, a payload distinct from ChromeLoader but that also stemmed from Charcoal Stork initial access, led to our decision to continue tracking Charcoal Stork separately.

via red canary threat reportredcanary.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence1

Analysis of SmashJacker and ChromeLoader MSI files delivered via concurrent Charcoal Stork campaigns showed several distinctions that led us to suspect Charcoal Stork is a pay-per-install (PPI) provider, responsible for the file naming and SEO and/or malvertising to get the click.

T1588.001MalwareEvidence1

SmashJacker was not built with Advanced Installer and instead installs a trojanized version of 7zip, which installs the malicious extension.

Persistence

1 technique
T1176Software ExtensionsEvidence1

ChromeLoader’s MSI was built using Advanced Installer and it installed a NodeJS application in order to deliver a malicious browser extension. SmashJacker was not built with Advanced Installer and instead installs a trojanized version of 7zip, which installs the malicious extension.

Stealth

1 technique
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Pulling that thread led us to an interesting pattern of files masquerading as cracked games and software or wallpaper downloads.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping4

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.