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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 1 actor

UnknownKiller

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For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Gentlemen

Gentlemen adapts newly published Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver proofs-of-concept quickly. The operators folded two recently disclosed examples, tracked as UnknownKiller and PoisonKiller, into their tooling within days of release.

via help net securityhelpnetsecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

unknown.sys is an unattributed signed kernel driver documented in public UnknownKiller / BlackSnufkin BYOVD research. The public PoCs identify the driver as exposing a process-kill primitive suitable for BYOVD process termination research.

Stealth

1 technique
T1211Exploitation for Defense EvasionEvidence1

GentleKiller... appears in at least eight variants, each one impersonating a different legitimate product and abusing a different vulnerable or malicious kernel driver. ... Gentlemen adapts newly published Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver proofs-of-concept quickly.

Impact

1 technique
T1489Service StopEvidence1

Use Case Privileges Operating System Terminate processes from kernel mode through an unattributed vulnerable driver.

Other

1 technique
T1562Impair DefensesEvidence1

Its operators develop and maintain a set of tools for shutting down endpoint detection and response (EDR) products, then provide these tools directly to the affiliates who rent the gang’s encryptors.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

13 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Hashes
13 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 days ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 days ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 days ago
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 days ago
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 days ago
hash.sha1●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 days ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching13

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping4

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.