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Malware

iDrive RemotePC

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For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

SimpleHelp ... is often used in phishing campaigns involving “invitation” lures in which the victim is encouraged to download and execute an invite to a party (e.g. Ecard9140.exe ).

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

A common lure is themed as a Social Security statement ( ssa.msi ) in an attempt to convince the victim they need to run the file to retrieve their statement.

Persistence

1 technique
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Once run, it installs a service called HostService , which runs Program Files (x86)\RemotePC Host\HostService.exe , which in turn runs the process remotepcservice.exe .

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

Once run, it installs a service called HostService , which runs Program Files (x86)\RemotePC Host\HostService.exe , which in turn runs the process remotepcservice.exe .

Stealth

2 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Even when the file is renamed to something like party_invite.exe , or Voicemailaudioext.exe ... A common lure is themed as a Social Security statement ( ssa.msi ) ... using lures such as a document ( docmentfilecsm_jw98evavuqm5gb3.exe ) or an IRS tax-related file ( IRS-Statement_Pr2ui4J9cfA6YEu.exe ).

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

Because the installer is signed and generated by PDQ, it bypasses many basic reputation checks.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

Over the last few years, threat actors have flocked to exploit legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools—blue-chip IT software like ScreenConnect, LogMeIn Resolve, and PDQ Connect—blurring the line between legitimate IT administration and malicious intrusion.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping6

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.