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Mallory
MalwareUsed by 1 actor

PteroDum

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For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Gamaredon Group

PteroDum serves a similar purpose, but for VBScript payloads, writing them temporarily to disk, executing them, and then deleting them.

via eset welivesecurity blogwelivesecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence1

The group tracked as Gamaredon spent the first half of the year developing six new PowerShell-based downloaders and shifted focus in the second half to launching at least 35 spear-phishing campaigns.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The group tracked as Gamaredon spent the first half of the year developing six new PowerShell-based downloaders.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

Gamaredon introduced six new tools in 2025, all written in PowerShell... PteroDee and PteroCache are straightforward PowerShell downloaders for fetching and executing PowerShell payloads in memory.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

PteroDum serves a similar purpose, but for VBScript payloads... Gamaredon also brought back PteroSetup, an older VBScript weaponizer

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

PteroDee and PteroCache are straightforward PowerShell downloaders for fetching and executing PowerShell payloads in memory... PteroOdd is a tiny downloader used to retrieve a single PowerShell payload via the Telegra.ph API.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping5

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.