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Mallory
MalwareUsed by 1 actor

PteroSetup

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Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Gamaredon Group

Also used is PteroSetup, an older Visual Basic Script (VBScript) weaponizer first detected in January 2021 and likely assumed to be discontinued. The tool scans USB and mapped network drives for legitimate installer files, and if found, replaces them with 7z self-extracting (SFX) archives containing the original installer and a malicious VBScript downloader.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence1

...facilitate lateral movement by infecting USB drives and network drives with malicious LNK files

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence2

PteroDum for fetching and executing VBScript payloads in memory... a malicious VBScript downloader

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

To the victim, the file still appears legitimate, but running it launches both the expected installer and the malicious code.

Discovery

1 technique
T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence1

The tool scans USB and mapped network drives for legitimate installer files

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence1

...facilitate lateral movement by infecting USB drives and network drives with malicious LNK files

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence2

Gamaredon's attacks are known to rely on weaponizers like PteroLNK and PteroPaste to facilitate lateral movement by infecting USB drives and network drives with malicious LNK files

Collection

1 technique
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

...replaces them with 7z self-extracting (SFX) archives containing the original installer and a malicious VBScript downloader.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping6

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.