Malware

DefenderKiller

For your environment

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Persistence

2 techniques

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Before starting it, we write three registry values: DeviceName for the device path, ImagePath for the driver location, and most importantly, AllowedProcessName set to our own executable's NT path.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

First, we create a kernel service pointing to the driver binary... Then we write it to the registry and start the service.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

ZwTerminateProcess executes from kernel mode on CloseHandle... the kill mechanism itself works against any process regardless of protection level. | The CLEANUP handler fires in the kernel, calls ZwTerminateProcess, and the target process is gone... the kill mechanism itself works against any process regardless of protection level.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

First, we create a kernel service pointing to the driver binary... Then we write it to the registry and start the service.

Stealth

1 technique

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

The kill fires on handle close (IRP_MJ_CLEANUP), not on the IOCTL itself... Then we close the handle. That’s it. The CLEANUP handler fires in the kernel, calls ZwTerminateProcess.

Defense Impairment

1 technique

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Before starting it, we write three registry values: DeviceName for the device path, ImagePath for the driver location, and most importantly, AllowedProcessName set to our own executable's NT path.

Other

1 technique

T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

Now lets test it against CrowdStrike... After running the DefenderKiller POC, CSFalconService.exe terminated, Falcon Sensor status Stopped... you can weaponize this further by running the kill in a loop targeting all known EDR process names.

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

medium jehadbudaggaNews

Jun 29, 2026

Born to Defend, Weaponized to Kill: Weaponizing Microsoft’s Own Driver to Kill EDRs | by Jehad Abudagga | Jun, 2026 | Medium

A weaponized proof-of-concept kernel driver/tool that creates a device, validates callers using a registry-controlled AllowedProcessName value, accepts IOCTL 0x222044 sub-command 8 to store a target PID, and terminates the target process from kernel mode on handle cleanup via ZwTerminateProcess. It is presented as capable of killing EDR processes such as CrowdStrike Falcon.

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IOC matching

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Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping5

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.