MuddyWater Deploys Phoenix v4 Backdoor via Phishing and VPN Infrastructure
The Iranian state-sponsored threat group MuddyWater has conducted a widespread cyber espionage campaign targeting over 100 government and international organizations, primarily in the Middle East and North Africa. The attackers leveraged compromised email accounts accessed through NordVPN exit nodes to distribute phishing emails containing malicious Word documents. These documents, when opened and macros enabled, deployed the FakeUpdate malware loader, which subsequently decrypted and installed the Phoenix v4 backdoor on victim systems. The campaign focused on diplomatic entities such as embassies, consulates, and ministries of foreign affairs, with the attackers adapting their techniques to bypass modern security controls, including the use of macro-based payloads despite Microsoft's default macro restrictions.
Researchers observed that after an initial phase using a command-and-control server, MuddyWater shifted tactics, likely employing additional tools and malware to further their espionage objectives. The Phoenix v4 backdoor, central to this operation, enabled persistent access and data exfiltration from compromised networks. The campaign highlights MuddyWater's continued evolution in attack methods and its focus on high-value government targets through sophisticated phishing and malware deployment strategies.
Get ahead of threats like this
Mallory correlates global threat intelligence with your attack surface — know if you’re exposed before adversaries strike.
How this story unfolded
5 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
Group-IB attributes Phoenix v4 campaign to MuddyWater
Researchers from Group-IB linked the campaign to MuddyWater based on malware similarities and victimology, identifying Phoenix v4 as the malware used against over 100 government entities. The public reporting also highlighted the group's return to macro-based delivery techniques despite Microsoft's default macro blocking.
Phoenix command-and-control infrastructure is taken down
On 2025-08-24, the server-side command-and-control infrastructure used in the campaign was taken offline, indicating the attackers may have shifted tactics or infrastructure. This marked a notable change in the operation shortly after it began.
Attackers use custom infostealer and remote management tools on victims
During the intrusion campaign, the operators also deployed a custom infostealer to steal browser credentials and used tools such as PDQ and Action1 RMM for software deployment and management on compromised systems. These actions expanded the operational capabilities of the intrusion beyond initial backdoor access.
Malicious Word documents deploy FakeUpdate and Phoenix v4 backdoor
As part of the campaign, phishing emails delivered malicious Word documents that installed the FakeUpdate loader and then the Phoenix v4 backdoor on victim systems. The activity primarily targeted embassies, diplomatic missions, foreign affairs ministries, and consulates.
MuddyWater begins phishing campaign against MENA government entities
On 2025-08-19, attackers attributed to the Iranian state-sponsored group MuddyWater started a campaign targeting more than 100 government organizations in the Middle East and North Africa. The operation used phishing emails sent from a compromised account accessed through a NordVPN exit node.
Related entities
Vulnerabilities, threat actors, malware, products, organizations, and breaches Mallory has linked to this story.
Sources
2 references tracked. Mallory keeps watching after this page renders.
See the full picture, correlated to your attack surface.
Map indicators from this story to your assets and identify affected systems in minutes.
Every observed campaign, victim, and pivot linked to actors named in this story.
Malware, exploits, and IOCs connected to the activity described here.
YARA, Sigma, and Snort rules deployed to your SIEM as soon as they’re published.
Get matching new stories delivered to your team as they break — not the next morning.
Ask questions about this story and take action on the answers.
Related stories
Other stories Mallory is tracking that overlap on entities, sources, or topic labels.
MuddyWater Used FakeUpdate and Phoenix Backdoor in Global Phishing Espionage
Group-IB reported that the Iran-linked **MuddyWater** threat actor ran a phishing campaign against international organizations and government targets by abusing a compromised mailbox accessed through **NordVPN**. The emails carried malicious Microsoft Word documents that prompted victims to enable macros; embedded VBA then dropped the **FakeUpdate** injector, which decrypted and launched **Phoenix backdoor v4**. The malware provided persistence, command execution, and communication with the command-and-control domain `screenai[.]online`, enabling continued access after initial compromise. Researchers attributed the activity to MuddyWater with high confidence based on malware overlaps, matching macro logic, shared infrastructure, and targeting patterns aligned with the group’s prior operations. The infrastructure also hosted a custom Chromium credential stealer and remote management tools including **PDQ** and **Action1**, indicating likely credential theft and follow-on access. Additional related samples pointed to concurrent or linked MuddyWater activity, including operations targeting the energy sector in the Middle East and North Africa, while prior reporting has described MuddyWater as an Iranian-linked umbrella of regionally focused subgroups.
May 25, 2026
MuddyWater Phishing Campaign Targets Middle East and North Africa Government Networks
Iranian state-sponsored threat actor MuddyWater has conducted a large-scale cyberespionage campaign breaching over 100 government entities and international organizations across the Middle East and North Africa. The attackers leveraged a compromised enterprise mailbox, accessed via NordVPN, to send convincing phishing emails from legitimate addresses to embassies, ministries, and telecom providers. These emails contained weaponized Microsoft Word attachments that, when opened and macros enabled, deployed the updated "Phoenix" backdoor, granting persistent remote access, credential theft, and file exfiltration capabilities. The campaign also utilized off-the-shelf remote management tools such as PDQ and Action1 to blend in with legitimate administrative traffic and pilfered browser passwords from Chrome, Edge, Opera, and Brave. Researchers at Group-IB highlighted that MuddyWater, also known as Seedworm, APT34, OilRig, and TA450, has demonstrated evolving tradecraft and operational maturity in this operation, mixing official government and personal email addresses to increase the likelihood of successful compromise. The campaign's scale and targeting suggest either a significant increase in capability or a broader intelligence collection mandate from Iranian authorities. MuddyWater, linked to Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security, has a history of targeting government, energy, telecom, and defense sectors, focusing on long-term espionage rather than destructive attacks. Analysts warn that further activity is likely amid ongoing regional tensions.
Mar 21, 2026
MuddyWater Cyberespionage Campaign Leveraging Snake Game-Inspired Malware
Iranian state-aligned threat group MuddyWater has launched a new cyberespionage campaign targeting organizations in Israel and Egypt, with a focus on technology, engineering, manufacturing, local government, and educational sectors. Researchers from ESET and other security firms have identified that MuddyWater is using a novel loader, dubbed Fooder, which masquerades as the classic Snake video game to deliver a new backdoor called MuddyViper. This loader introduces execution delays, inspired by the Snake game's mechanics, to evade antivirus detection. The campaign also employs spearphishing emails with PDF attachments that link to remote monitoring and management software installers, hosted on free file-sharing services, to gain initial access. The MuddyViper backdoor enables attackers to collect system information, execute files and shell commands, transfer files, and exfiltrate Windows login credentials and browser data. Additional tools, such as credential stealers and another backdoor named VAX One, have also been deployed. MuddyWater's evolving tactics, including the use of reflective loading for in-memory execution and the impersonation of legitimate software, demonstrate increased sophistication and a continued focus on defense evasion and persistence. Security researchers note the possibility that MuddyWater may be acting as an initial access broker for other Iranian threat actors, given observed overlaps in operations.
Mar 21, 2026