ServiceNow Now Assist AI Agents Vulnerable to Second-Order Prompt Injection Attacks
Security researchers have identified that ServiceNow's Now Assist generative AI platform is susceptible to second-order prompt injection attacks due to its default agent-to-agent discovery and collaboration features. Attackers can exploit these configurations to manipulate benign AI agents into recruiting other agents with broader privileges, enabling unauthorized actions such as data exfiltration, record modification, privilege escalation, and sending emails, all without the victim organization's awareness. The vulnerability is not a flaw in the AI itself but stems from expected behavior defined by default configuration options, which are often overlooked by administrators.
The research, conducted by AppOmni, highlights that even with built-in prompt injection protections enabled, malicious prompts embedded in accessible content can trigger a chain reaction among agents. The system's inability to distinguish between trusted instructions and untrusted data, combined with the orchestrator's role in assigning tasks, increases the risk in multi-agent environments. The issue is exacerbated by the fact that large language models prioritize task completion, making them susceptible to treating maliciously crafted text as legitimate instructions, thereby allowing attacks to bypass existing security controls.

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How this story unfolded
3 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
ServiceNow adds scoped-permission 'AI user' option for agents
ServiceNow introduced a capability to run AI agents under a dedicated 'AI user' with scoped permissions, improving control over agent authority. This change addressed prior difficulty in limiting agent privileges and reduced the impact of prompt-injection abuse.
Researchers demonstrate privilege escalation via malicious ticket content
In a proof-of-concept attack, a low-privileged user placed malicious instructions in a ticket that were later processed by ServiceNow orchestration components. This caused unauthorized actions including data access and privilege escalation across a multi-agent workflow.
AppOmni identifies prompt-injection risk in ServiceNow Now Assist agents
AppOmni researchers discovered that AI agents in ServiceNow's Now Assist platform could be manipulated through second-order prompt injection, even when protections were enabled. The issue stemmed from default settings that allowed agent discovery and agent-to-agent communication, enabling lower-privileged agents to influence higher-privileged ones.
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Sources
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ServiceNow AI Agents Can Be Tricked Into Acting Against Each Other via Second-Order Prompts
thehackernews.com
Open sourceMisconfigured AI Agents Let Attacks Slip Past Controls
bankinfosecurity.com
Open sourceMisconfigured AI Agents Let Attacks Slip Past Controls
govinfosecurity.com
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