Lumma Stealer Infections with Follow-Up Malware
Multiple incidents have been documented involving the deployment of the Lumma Stealer malware on Windows systems, followed by the installation of additional malicious payloads. Technical analysis reveals that the Lumma Stealer installer, a large PE32 executable, temporarily saves several files to the infected host, including AutoIt3 scripts and various data files. The infection process also generates a custom .a3x AutoIt3 script and establishes command-and-control (C2) communications with domains such as offenms[.]cyou. Network traffic captures and file samples from these incidents have been made available for further analysis, providing insight into the infection chain and the nature of the follow-up malware.
Indicators of compromise (IOCs), packet capture files, and extracted malware samples have been published to assist defenders in identifying and mitigating these threats. The technical details include SHA256 hashes of the malware, file paths used during infection, and specifics about the C2 infrastructure. These resources enable security teams to detect similar infections and understand the tactics used by threat actors leveraging Lumma Stealer in multi-stage attacks.
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