Multiple Misconfiguration and Access-Control Flaws Expose AI and SaaS Platforms to Data Theft and Account Takeover

Security researchers reported a critical Moltbook exposure caused by an unauthenticated database/API access issue that allowed enumeration of agent records (e.g., GET /api/agents/{id}) and leakage of email addresses, JWT login_tokens, and third-party api_keys, enabling agent hijacking and downstream abuse of connected services. Separately, Cal.com Cloud was found vulnerable to a chained set of broken access controls and signup/invite-token logic flaws that enabled complete account takeover and access to sensitive booking data (attendee details, emails, and booking histories) at scale, including organizational accounts.

In parallel, SentinelLabs documented that roughly 175,000 internet-exposed Ollama instances were reachable due to common deployment misconfiguration (binding to 0.0.0.0/public interfaces), creating conditions for arbitrary code execution and access to external resources—especially where tool-calling features were enabled. A distinct IoT case study described Molekule air purifiers exposing fleet-wide telemetry because an AWS Cognito Identity Pool permitted unauthenticated access to AWS IoT Core MQTT subscriptions, leaking device shadow data (e.g., Wi‑Fi SSIDs, MAC addresses, device names, sensor readings) for ~100,000 devices; the disclosed policy reportedly allowed read/subscribe access but not device control without per-device certificates.