Static Tundra Sabotage Attempts Against Poland’s Energy Sector Using DynoWiper
CERT Polska reported late-2025 sabotage activity against Poland’s energy sector attributed to the threat actor Static Tundra, including coordinated intrusions affecting renewable energy facilities, a large combined heat and power (CHP) plant, and an energy-linked manufacturer. The activity showed a shift from espionage to disruption, including an operational technology (OT) incident in which attackers reached a renewable facility’s Grid Control Point (GCP) and executed a shutdown of industrial automation devices. Investigators also observed targeting of Moxa NPort serial-to-Ethernet devices, including password changes to lock out operators and deployment of corrupted firmware that could prevent controller startup and require manual recovery.
The same reporting described two destructive malware families, DynoWiper and LazyWiper, used to render systems and data unrecoverable; DynoWiper was documented deleting files from Mikronika RTU controllers, while LazyWiper appeared to provide redundant destructive capability. Separately, an opinion piece highlighted that attempted disruption of the Polish distribution grid was rebuffed and reported, and used the Poland case (alongside speculative discussion of Venezuela) to argue that energy infrastructure attacks are becoming more common; it provided limited additional technical detail beyond noting ambiguity around attribution and the broader trend toward “democratized” attack tooling.
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