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Multiple malware campaigns using compromised websites and phishing lures to deliver RATs and stealers

spoofed websitescompromised websitesphishingstealerfake updatesbackdoorfake captchatyposquattingvalleyrattelegram botcloudflare r2wordpressnetsupportpowershelljavascript injection
Updated February 25, 2026 at 03:03 AM2 sources
Multiple malware campaigns using compromised websites and phishing lures to deliver RATs and stealers

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Threat actors are using compromised or spoofed websites to trick victims into executing malware, with lures ranging from fake browser updates to counterfeit security-software download pages. Recorded Future’s Insikt Group reported that financially motivated GrayCharlie (overlapping with SmartApeSG) compromised multiple U.S. law-firm WordPress sites—potentially via a shared IT/marketing provider—and injected externally hosted JavaScript that redirected visitors to bogus update pages or fake CAPTCHA flows. Victims were prompted to run a PowerShell command via the Windows Run dialog, leading to NetSupport RAT installation and follow-on delivery of Stealc and SectopRAT; the operation’s infrastructure was noted as being supported by MivoCloud and HZ Hosting Ltd.

Separately, Malwarebytes-linked reporting described a typosquatting campaign impersonating the Huorong antivirus site (huoronga[.]com vs. huorong.cn) to distribute ValleyRAT (built on the Winos4.0 framework), attributed to the Chinese-speaking Silver Fox APT; the payload was routed through an intermediary domain and hosted on Cloudflare R2, with a ZIP masquerading as Huorong (BR火绒445[.]zip). In a different region and access vector, Group-IB reported Iran-linked MuddyWater running Operation Olalampo against MENA targets using phishing emails with malicious Office documents/macros to deploy new tooling including GhostFetch (dropping GhostBackDoor) and CHAR (a Rust backdoor controlled via a Telegram bot), plus variants using HTTP_VIP to deploy AnyDesk; the campaign also leveraged recently disclosed vulnerabilities on public-facing servers for initial access.

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Malware campaigns abusing trusted software channels (browser extensions, developer tools, and Google Ads) to deliver RATs and stealers

Malware campaigns abusing trusted software channels (browser extensions, developer tools, and Google Ads) to deliver RATs and stealers

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1 months ago
Malware Delivery via Deceptive Lures: Malvertising, Fake Recruitment Repos, and Phishing Dropping RATs

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2 weeks ago

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