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Multiple APT and malware campaigns abusing phishing, cloud services, and signed binaries

phishingsigned binariescredential theftev code-signingbackdoorasyncratpowershellmesh agentdll sideloadingdns tunnelingtactical rmmdns-over-httpscloudflare tunnelwebdavcobalt strike
Updated March 4, 2026 at 02:00 PM11 sources
Multiple APT and malware campaigns abusing phishing, cloud services, and signed binaries

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Reporting across multiple research teams described a surge of distinct, ongoing intrusion campaigns rather than a single unified incident. Check Point reported on Silver Dragon, a Chinese-aligned activity cluster assessed as operating under the broader APT41 umbrella, targeting organizations in Southeast Asia and Europe (notably government) via exploitation of public-facing servers and phishing, then deploying Cobalt Strike, DNS tunneling, and a new Google Drive–based backdoor (GearDoor) alongside custom tools (SSHcmd and SliverScreen) for remote access and screen capture. Microsoft detailed separate February 2026 phishing campaigns by an unknown actor that used meeting/invoice-style lures and EV code-signed malware (certificate issued to TrustConnect Software PTY LTD) masquerading as common workplace apps (e.g., msteams.exe, adobereader.exe, zoomworkspace.clientsetup.exe) to install legitimate RMM tooling (ScreenConnect, Tactical RMM, Mesh Agent) for persistent access and lateral movement.

Other reporting highlighted additional, unrelated campaigns and tradecraft: ClearSky described a Russian-aligned operation targeting Ukraine using a phishing-delivered ZIP/HTA chain that drops a .NET loader (BadPaw) and backdoor (MeowMeow) with .NET Reactor obfuscation, parameter-gated execution, and sandbox/tooling checks (with low-confidence linkage to APT28). Cofense-reported activity (via SC Media) showed phishing that weaponizes Windows File Explorer + WebDAV using URL/LNK shortcuts to pull payloads (notably AsyncRAT, XWorm, DcRAT) and infrastructure including Cloudflare Tunnel domains hosting WebDAV servers. Cisco Talos-reported Dohdoor activity (UAT-10027) targeted US education and healthcare, using PowerShell→batch→DLL sideloading via legitimate executables (e.g., Fondue.exe, mblctr.exe, ScreenClippingHost.exe) and DNS-over-HTTPS to Cloudflare for C2 discovery and tunneling. Separately, Zscaler reported ScarCruft’s Ruby Jumper campaign using Zoho WorkDrive for C2 and removable media components to reach air-gapped systems, while another Zscaler report analyzed Dust Specter targeting Iraqi government officials with password-protected RAR delivery and modular implants. Qianxin XLab assessed sanctioned infrastructure provider Funnull resurfacing to support scam/criminal supply chains and potential MacCMS-related supply-chain activity, and F5 Labs summarized APT42’s TAMECAT PowerShell backdoor focused on Edge/Chrome credential theft with C2 over Telegram/Discord/HTTPS and specific file/hash indicators. (A separate Help Net Security item on a Microsoft Defender onboarding tool is product/administrative news and not part of the threat-campaign reporting.)

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