npm Supply-Chain Attacks Steal Developer Tokens and Enable Cloud Compromise
Threat actors are using malicious npm packages to steal developer credentials and CI/CD secrets, enabling rapid escalation into cloud environments. Google reported that UNC6426 leveraged keys stolen during the earlier compromise of the nx npm ecosystem to pivot from a stolen developer GitHub token into AWS administrative access within 72 hours, abusing GitHub-to-AWS OpenID Connect (OIDC) trust to create a new admin role. The actor then used that access to exfiltrate data from AWS S3 and conduct destructive actions in production cloud environments; the initial nx compromise involved a GitHub Actions pull_request_target workflow abuse (“Pwn Request”) that enabled publishing trojanized packages containing a postinstall chain that executed the QUIETVAULT JavaScript credential stealer and uploaded stolen data to a public GitHub repo (/s1ngularity-repository-1).
Separately, researchers reported new waves of the PhantomRaven npm supply-chain campaign distributing 88 additional malicious packages (via ~50 disposable accounts) that target JavaScript developers by exfiltrating secrets from files like .gitconfig and .npmrc, environment variables, and CI/CD tokens (e.g., GitHub/GitLab/Jenkins/CircleCI). The campaign uses slopsquatting (LLM-suggested lookalike package names) and a stealth technique called Remote Dynamic Dependencies (RDD), where package.json pulls a dependency from an external URL so the malicious payload is fetched at install time (npm install) and can evade static package inspection; researchers indicated many of these packages remained available in the npm registry at the time of reporting.

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How this story unfolded
6 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
Endor Labs documents ongoing PhantomRaven activity
By March 2026, Endor Labs reported that PhantomRaven infrastructure and payload code remained consistent across waves and that many malicious packages were still available on npm. This indicated the campaign was ongoing at the time of reporting.
UNC6426 exfiltrates data and disrupts production AWS resources
After gaining AWS administrator privileges, UNC6426 exfiltrated data from S3, terminated production EC2 and RDS resources, decrypted application keys, and exposed internal GitHub repositories by renaming and making them public. Google reported the full compromise unfolded in less than 72 hours.
UNC6426 compromises victim cloud environment in under 72 hours
Using credentials stolen from the nx package compromise, UNC6426 accessed a victim's GitHub environment, extracted more CI/CD secrets, abused GitHub-to-AWS OIDC trust, and obtained AWS STS tokens. The actor then deployed a permissive CloudFormation stack to create a new IAM role with AdministratorAccess.
Additional PhantomRaven attack waves hit npm
Endor Labs identified three more PhantomRaven waves spanning November 2025 through February 2026, expanding the campaign to dozens of malicious packages and many disposable publisher accounts. The actor used slopsquatting package names and Remote Dynamic Dependencies to fetch payloads at install time.
PhantomRaven npm campaign first reported by Koi
Koi initially reported the PhantomRaven supply-chain campaign targeting the npm registry with malicious JavaScript packages that steal developer and CI/CD credentials. The activity was identified in October 2025.
nx npm supply-chain compromise enables credential theft
In 2025, attackers compromised the nx npm package through a vulnerable pull_request_target workflow, leading to trojanized Nx-related packages that executed the QUIETVAULT credential stealer. The malware harvested tokens and other sensitive data and uploaded them to a public GitHub repository.
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Sources
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