Warlock Ransomware Expands SharePoint Intrusions With Stealthier Post-Exploitation
Warlock ransomware operators have continued exploiting unpatched Microsoft SharePoint servers, but recent intrusions show a more mature post-exploitation playbook focused on persistence, lateral movement, and evasion after initial access. Trend Micro reported the group is now using a bring your own vulnerable driver (BYOVD) technique involving the Nsec driver, alongside tools such as TightVNC and the Yuze reverse proxy, to move more quietly across victim networks and reduce the chance of detection. The activity has affected organizations in the technology, manufacturing, and government sectors, with observed victims in the U.S., Germany, and Russia.
Incident details show the operators escalating to full domain compromise by abusing credentials, resetting the built-in Administrator account, and adding users to the Domain Administrators group. They used PsExec, PowerShell Remoting, MSI-based deployment of TightVNC, and RDP-enabling utilities to maintain remote access and spread laterally, while web shells, tunneling, and other remote-control mechanisms supported persistence and command-and-control. The reporting indicates Warlock has kept its SharePoint exploitation path consistent, but has significantly strengthened the actions that follow compromise, giving defenders a clearer set of behaviors to hunt for beyond the initial server exploit.

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How this story unfolded
8 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
Trend Micro publishes analysis of Warlock’s enhanced tradecraft
Trend Micro disclosed details of the January 2026 intrusion, describing Warlock’s improved post-exploitation methods, expanded toolset, and use of stealthy tunneling and BYOVD techniques.
Ransomware execution drops lockdatareadme.txt note
The attack’s impact phase culminated in ransomware execution across the environment, after which a ransom note named lockdatareadme.txt was dropped on affected systems.
Warlock stages ransomware via SYSVOL, NETLOGON, and Group Policy
The operators placed ransomware components in SYSVOL and NETLOGON shares and configured Active Directory Group Policy startup scripts to execute the RunCryptor export from run.dll across the enterprise.
Data is exfiltrated to an attacker-controlled S3 bucket
Before ransomware deployment, the intruders used a renamed rclone binary, TrendFileSecurityCheck.exe, to steal data from the victim network and transfer it to an attacker-controlled Amazon S3 bucket.
Warlock uses BYOVD to disable security tools
The attackers abused the vulnerable NSecKrnl.sys driver in a bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver technique, using a renamed loader called TrendSecurity.exe to impair security products across the environment.
Attackers expand persistence, lateral movement, and covert access
During the intrusion, the operators used PsExec, PowerShell Remoting, TightVNC, Velociraptor, VS Code CLI tunneling, Cloudflare Tunnel, Yuze, and RDP patching to move laterally and maintain multiple redundant access and command-and-control channels.
Warlock compromises a victim network in a January 2026 intrusion
In January 2026, Warlock gained access to a victim environment and remained inside for about 15 days. The intrusion ultimately resulted in full domain-level control and preparation for enterprise-wide ransomware deployment.
Warlock continues exploiting unpatched SharePoint servers for initial access
Warlock, also tracked as Water Manaul, continued using known Internet-facing Microsoft SharePoint vulnerabilities for intrusion, including CVE-2025-49706, CVE-2025-49704, CVE-2025-53770, and CVE-2025-53771. Researchers linked the group’s initial access activity to SharePoint worker processes.
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Sources
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