LiteLLM Hit by PyPI Supply-Chain Compromise and Guardrail Sandbox Escape
Datadog Security Labs reported that the TeamPCP supply-chain campaign compromised the legitimate PyPI package LiteLLM, publishing malicious versions 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 that stole credentials, exfiltrated data, established persistence, and in some cases attempted to spread into Kubernetes environments. The campaign also hit Telnyx on PyPI and was linked to earlier compromises involving Trivy, npm packages, Aqua Security repositories, and Checkmarx tooling, with researchers concluding that stolen CI/CD and publishing credentials were reused across ecosystems. Datadog warned that LiteLLM 1.82.8 was especially dangerous because a malicious .pth file triggered payload execution when the Python interpreter started, while the Telnyx package executed code at import time and retrieved a second-stage payload hidden in a WAV file.
Separately, X41 disclosed a high-severity sandbox escape in BerriAI LiteLLM affecting the main-latest Docker image, where authenticated users could reach arbitrary code execution through the /guardrails/test_custom_code API endpoint. The flaw relied on bypassing regex-based restrictions on custom Python guardrail code using string concatenation and CPython bytecode rewriting to recover unrestricted builtins and call __import__, allowing commands to run as the LiteLLM process user, which is root in the default Docker deployment. X41 assigned the issue CWE-94 and a CVSS 4.0 score of 8.7, and Datadog advised organizations that installed the malicious LiteLLM releases to treat affected hosts and CI jobs as full credential-exposure events, rotate secrets, hunt for persistence and outbound traffic, and rebuild critical systems from known-good images rather than relying only on package rollback.

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How this story unfolded
6 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
Gurucul identifies Mercor as downstream victim of LiteLLM compromise
Gurucul reported that the malicious LiteLLM supply-chain compromise impacted downstream users, including Mercor, where the compromised dependency enabled unauthorized data access and possible command execution. The report framed Mercor as a case study of the breach's downstream effects.
Malicious Telnyx releases 4.87.1 and 4.87.2 published to PyPI
Attackers also compromised the legitimate Telnyx Python package on PyPI, publishing malicious versions 4.87.1 and 4.87.2. The package executed malicious code at import time and retrieved a second-stage payload concealed in a WAV file.
Datadog links LiteLLM and Telnyx compromises to TeamPCP campaign
Datadog Security Research reported that the PyPI compromises of LiteLLM and Telnyx were part of the broader TeamPCP supply-chain campaign, which had previously affected Trivy, npm packages, Aqua Security repositories, and Checkmarx tooling. The report said stolen CI/CD and publishing credentials were reused across ecosystems to expand the campaign.
Malicious LiteLLM releases 1.82.7 and 1.82.8 published to PyPI
As part of the TeamPCP supply-chain campaign, attackers compromised the legitimate LiteLLM package on PyPI and published malicious versions 1.82.7 and 1.82.8. Datadog assessed version 1.82.8 as especially dangerous because a malicious .pth file triggered payload execution at Python interpreter startup.
X41 publicly discloses unpatched LiteLLM RCE vulnerability
X41 D-Sec published advisory X41-2026-001 describing a LiteLLM sandbox escape that could lead to arbitrary code execution as the LiteLLM process user, which is root by default in the affected Docker image. At publication, no patch was available.
X41 reports LiteLLM guardrail sandbox escape to vendor
According to the advisory's disclosure timeline, X41 D-Sec privately reported a high-severity sandbox escape in LiteLLM's /guardrails/test_custom_code endpoint in February 2026. The flaw allowed authenticated users to bypass source filtering and achieve arbitrary code execution in the default Docker deployment.
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Sources
4 references tracked. Mallory keeps watching after this page renders.
LiteLLM Supply Chain Compromise: Downstream Impact Analysis with Mercor Breach Case Study | Community Portal | Gurucul
community.gurucul.com
Open sourceDeep Analysis: The LiteLLM Supply Chain Poisoning Incident - A Full-Link Analysis of the TeamPCP Three-Stage Backdoor - Alibaba Cloud Community
alibabacloud.com
Open sourceLiteLLM and Telnyx compromised on PyPI: Tracing the TeamPCP supply chain campaign | Datadog Security Labs
securitylabs.datadoghq.com
Open sourceoss-sec: X41 Advisory X41-2026-001: Guardrail Sandbox Escape in LiteLLM
seclists.org
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