Deleted Google API Keys Stayed Valid Long Enough for Continued Abuse
Aikido Security reported that standard Google Cloud API keys can continue authenticating for up to 23 minutes after deletion, with a median revocation delay of about 16 minutes across 10 tests. The researchers said the gap appears tied to Google’s eventually consistent backend infrastructure, producing inconsistent, region-dependent results in which repeated requests may still reach servers that accept a supposedly deleted key. The behavior was observed not only for Gemini access but also for other Google Cloud APIs including BigQuery and Maps, contradicting Google Cloud interface messaging that deleted keys can no longer be used immediately.
Researchers warned that the post-deletion window could let attackers keep using leaked keys to access enabled services, exfiltrate uploaded files or cached Gemini conversation context, and generate substantial cloud charges, especially where automatic billing tier upgrades raise spending caps during spikes. Aikido said newer Gemini-specific API keys revoked in about a minute and service account keys in roughly five seconds, indicating faster revocation is technically feasible, but Google reportedly classified the delayed revocation as intended behavior and closed the disclosure as "won't fix." The firm advised defenders to treat API key deletion as a 30-minute incident-response process and closely monitor usage after revocation.
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How this story unfolded
5 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
Aikido publicly warns deletion should be treated as a 30-minute response window
In its public disclosure, Aikido warned that attackers with stolen keys could continue making API calls, incur billing charges, and potentially access Gemini-related data during the post-deletion window. The company advised defenders to treat key deletion as the start of a roughly 30-minute monitoring and incident-response period rather than immediate revocation.
Aikido discloses issue to Google; Google closes report as 'won't fix'
After reporting the delayed revocation behavior, Aikido said Google treated it as intended or known system behavior rather than a security flaw and closed the disclosure as 'won't fix.' Google therefore did not plan a remediation for the standard API key revocation gap described by the researchers.
Aikido compares revocation timing with other Google credential types
The researchers reported that other Google credential types revoked much faster, including newer Gemini-specific API keys in about 1 minute and service account keys in about 5 seconds. They concluded the slower revocation of standard API keys is a property of that credential type rather than an unavoidable platform limitation.
Researchers confirm issue affects Gemini, BigQuery, Maps, and varies by region
Aikido found the delayed revocation behavior was not limited to one service: it affected keys usable with Gemini and other GCP APIs including BigQuery and Maps. Additional testing across Google Cloud regions showed differing success rates after deletion, suggesting regional routing, caching, or backend enforcement differences.
Aikido tests show deleted Google API keys remain usable after deletion
In 10 trials conducted over two days, Aikido Security found that standard Google Cloud API keys continued to authenticate for roughly 8 to 23 minutes after deletion, with a median revocation delay of about 16 minutes. The researchers observed inconsistent post-deletion acceptance, indicating revocation propagates gradually across Google's infrastructure.
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Deleted Google API Keys Continue Accessing Gemini, BigQuery, and Maps APIs
cybersecuritynews.com
Open sourceDeleted Google API keys keep working for up to 23 minutes, researchers warn - Help Net Security
helpnetsecurity.com
Open sourceThreat hunters find Google API keys still usable 23 minutes after deletion
theregister.com
Open sourceGoogle API keys keep working after you delete them long enough to be exploited
aikido.dev
Open sourceGoogle API Keys Remain Active After Deletion
darkreading.com
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