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Researchers reported that malicious Android applications, including VPN-themed apps and software built with the LumiApps SDK, secretly enrolled users’ devices into a proxy network and routed third-party traffic through them without informed consent. HUMAN’s Satori team said the operation, tracked as PROXYLIB, used a Golang-based native library, libgojni.so, to contact command-and-control servers, register infected phones, and maintain persistent proxy connections through Android services and boot receivers.
The activity was linked to earlier infections found in Oko VPN and 28 related Google Play apps, as well as a later variant that could be embedded during app development or injected into APKs without source-code access. Investigators said the infrastructure and monetization appeared tied to Asocks, a residential proxy service, indicating the compromised devices were likely being sold as proxy exit nodes for cybercriminal use. Google removed the identified apps from Google Play, and Google Play Protect now detects or blocks known PROXYLIB-related applications, while researchers warned the operators are likely to keep shifting to third-party app stores and modified APK distribution.
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3 events from the most recent confirmed update back to the earliest known activity.
HUMAN found that a later variant of the operation used the LumiApps SDK, which could be integrated during app development or injected into APKs without source code access. The SDK used a Golang native library, libgojni.so, to contact command-and-control infrastructure, enroll devices, and maintain persistent proxy connections.
Google removed 28 identified apps from the Play Store after they were linked to the PROXYLIB Android proxy-enrollment operation. Google Play Protect also began detecting or blocking known PROXYLIB-related apps.
HUMAN Security analyzed an earlier PROXYLIB variant observed in Oko VPN and 28 related Google Play apps that covertly enrolled Android devices as residential proxy nodes. The investigation also tied the operation to Asocks, a residential proxy seller believed to monetize traffic routed through affected devices.
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Researchers from Synthient, Qurium, Nokia Deepfield, and others said the long-running **Popa** Android proxyware ecosystem enrolls phones, tablets, streaming devices, and unofficial Android TV boxes into a residential proxy network, and linked parts of that activity to **NetNut**, a proxy provider owned by **Alarum Technologies**. The reporting describes Popa as a plugin tied to the `Vo1d` malware ecosystem that can maintain persistent encrypted tunnels and relay third-party traffic for uses including advertising fraud, account takeovers, mass scraping, and possible access into local networks. Estimates cited by researchers put the network at roughly **1.5 million to 2.5 million daily IPs**, indicating years of operation at significant scale. Synthient said it identified multiple Popa-related variants, including **Moneytiser**, **Loopop**, and **Neupop**, and found that analyzed samples often began proxying traffic as soon as the host app launched. In controlled testing, the firm said some Popa-enrolled devices egressed traffic through NetNut’s commercial proxy gateway, while 18 Android samples communicated directly with `sdk.netnut.io` and some APKs referenced both `sdk.netnut.io` and `cyberprotector.online`; researchers also said none of more than 20 examined publishers invoked an optional consent prompt present in version `2.7.46`. **NetNut** rejected the findings and said it operates a legitimate proxy network with KYC, due-diligence, and misuse-monitoring controls, while broader reporting warned that embedded residential proxy SDKs in consumer apps are increasingly being used for AI-related scraping without meaningful user consent.
Jul 3, 2026
Security researchers reported that residential proxy networks are increasingly being used to route malicious traffic through legitimate home internet connections, helping attackers evade IP reputation controls while making abuse appear to come from ordinary consumers and organizations. Infoblox said more than **65%** of its cloud customers queried domains tied to residential proxy services in 2026, with monthly DNS traffic rising from roughly **300–400 billion** queries in early 2025 to more than **500 billion** by April 2026, affecting every industry vertical examined, including healthcare, pharmaceuticals, banking, government, electronics, food and beverage, and industrial sectors. The company also observed no meaningful drop after disruption efforts against **IPIDEA**, and recorded a **265%** single-day spike in queries to `ipinfo[.]ipidea[.]io` on January 23. Separate telemetry from Gen Digital linked residential proxy traffic to **7.4 million** malicious incidents affecting **572,000** users since January 2026, with notable concentration in India, Vietnam, and Brazil. Researchers said devices are often enrolled through pay-for-bandwidth apps, free VPNs, browser extensions, bundled SDKs, preinstalled Android TV software, IoT devices, malware, and potentially unwanted applications, sometimes without clear user consent. The reports warn that these networks are being used for phishing, credential stuffing, account takeover, ad fraud, scams, scraping, and reconnaissance, while shifting legal, reputational, and performance risks onto households and enterprises whose IP addresses become exit nodes. Recommended mitigations include **Protective DNS**, DNS log reviews, auditing apps and browser extensions for embedded proxy components, inspecting connected devices, and removing unknown or suspicious software.
Jun 29, 2026
Researchers reported active distribution of the Android malware **Mirax**, a remote access trojan that combines banking credential theft with residential proxy functionality, allowing attackers to turn infected phones into **SOCKS5** proxy nodes while harvesting sensitive data. Cleafy said campaigns aimed largely at Spanish-speaking users reached more than **220,000** accounts across Meta platforms including Facebook, Instagram, Messenger, and Threads, using fake IPTV and sports-streaming lures, phishing pages, and **GitHub Releases**-hosted dropper APKs to drive sideloaded infections. Mirax is described as a restricted **malware-as-a-service** offering linked to the underground **"Mirax Bot"** ecosystem and reportedly marketed mainly to trusted Russian-speaking affiliates. Once installed, the malware abuses Android Accessibility Services, deploys credential-theft overlays, and maintains multiple WebSocket command-and-control channels on ports `8443`, `8444`, and `8445`; its use of **SOCKS5**, **Yamux**, and residential IP routing helps attackers evade fraud controls and support follow-on activity such as account takeover, transaction fraud, password spraying, and broader anonymous abuse through victims’ devices.
Jun 29, 2026