Authentication Bypass in Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure Web Component
CVE-2023-46805 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in the web component of Ivanti Connect Secure (ICS, formerly Pulse Connect Secure) 9.x and 22.x and Ivanti Policy Secure. The flaw allows a remote attacker to bypass control checks and access restricted resources without valid authentication. The provided content repeatedly characterizes the issue as an auth bypass in the web component and notes reporting that exploitation involved path traversal behavior against web resources such as /api/v1/configuration/... endpoints. In observed intrusions, this vulnerability was commonly chained with CVE-2024-21887, a command injection flaw, to turn unauthorized access to restricted resources into unauthenticated remote command execution on exposed Ivanti gateways.
Are you exposed to this one?
Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.
Impact, mitigation & remediation
What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.
Impact
What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.
Mitigation
If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.
Remediation
Patch, then assume compromise.
Exploits
2 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (4 hidden).
This repository is a multi-module Python offensive framework centered on exploiting HiSilicon DVR/NVR/IP camera devices via CVE-2020-25078, then managing compromised hosts through a Flask/SocketIO web panel. It is not a simple single-file PoC: it includes a control server (server.py), persistence and post-exploitation tooling, credential attacks, recon modules, web vulnerability scanners, network service checks, pivoting, reverse shell support, and a SQLite-backed datastore. Core exploit logic is in exploit.py and scanner.py. exploit.py probes numerous traversal/disclosure paths such as /../../.../mnt/mtd/Config/Account1 and related config/system files, parses returned content with multiple regex patterns to recover credentials, fingerprints device families, and falls back to known default credentials when disclosure succeeds but parsing does not. scanner.py operationalizes this by scanning IPs/CIDRs and common ports, checking liveness, fingerprinting likely cameras, invoking the CVE-2020-25078 checks, and storing recovered credentials in cameras.db. Post-exploitation capability is substantial. telnet_client.py provides raw Telnet login and command execution. botnet.py fans out commands across stored hosts. persistence.py installs SSH authorized_keys, cron, rc.local, init.d, systemd, inittab telnetd, and bind-shell style persistence. reverse_shell.py generates many Linux/IoT reverse shell one-liners and runs listeners. pivot_chain.py and socks_pivot.py support chained execution and local SOCKS5 pivoting through compromised hosts. Additional modules broaden scope beyond the HiSilicon exploit: brute.py and cred_spray.py perform credential attacks across Telnet, SSH, FTP, HTTP, SMB, databases, VNC, LDAP, WinRM, and more; network_exploit.py checks for exposed/misconfigured services and some well-known vulnerabilities such as MS17-010 and BlueKeep; web_exploit.py, web_cves.py, web_bugs.py, and web_brute.py scan websites for exposed files, CMS fingerprints, generic bug classes, and multiple CVE signatures. Recon/intel support includes ASN, DNS, GeoIP, JARM, WAF detection, proxy/Tor rotation, screenshot grabbing from camera snapshot endpoints, and Telegram/Discord/AbuseIPDB integrations. The repository structure is coherent and functional, with many CLI-capable modules and a central web UI in templates/index.html. Overall, this is an operational exploit-and-post-exploitation toolkit focused on HiSilicon IoT devices but expanded into a broader C2-style offensive platform.
This repository provides two Bash proof-of-concept exploit scripts targeting Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure appliances (versions 9.x and 22.x) for CVE-2023-46805 (authentication bypass) and CVE-2024-21887 (command injection). The structure consists of two shell scripts and a detailed README. - CVE-2023-46805.sh exploits an authentication bypass by sending a crafted GET request to a system information endpoint, allowing unauthenticated access to restricted data. - CVE-2024-21887.sh exploits a command injection vulnerability by injecting a user-supplied command (URL-encoded) into a specific API endpoint, allowing an authenticated administrator to execute arbitrary commands on the appliance. The README provides usage instructions, example endpoints, and additional API paths that may be of interest for further exploitation or post-exploitation activities. The scripts require standard Unix utilities (curl, json_pp, xxd, tr, sed) and are intended for use in a command-line environment. No hardcoded IPs or credentials are present; the user supplies the target URL and, for the command injection, the payload command. The attack vector is network-based, targeting exposed web interfaces of vulnerable Ivanti appliances.
Affected products & vendors
Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.
Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.
Recent activity
47 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Ivanti Connect Secure authentication bypass vulnerability via path traversal that is used as the first stage in a pre-auth RCE exploit chain.
An Ivanti Connect Secure/Policy Secure vulnerability exploited by Storm-1175 as part of rapid intrusion activity.
A specific Ivanti Connect Secure / Policy Secure vulnerability exploited by Storm-1175.
A vulnerability in Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure exploited by Storm-1175 in recent campaigns.
The version that knows your environment.
Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.
Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.
Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.