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Mallory
MediumPublic exploit

OS Command Injection in TBK DVR-4104 and DVR-4216

IdentifiersCVE-2024-3721CWE-78· Improper Neutralization of Special…

CVE-2024-3721 is an OS command injection vulnerability affecting TBK DVR-4104 and DVR-4216 digital video recorder devices, including versions up to at least 20240412. The flaw is exposed through the HTTP endpoint /device.rsp?opt=sys&cmd=S_O_S_T_R_E_A_MAX, where improper handling of the mdb and mdc request arguments allows attacker-controlled input to be incorporated into operating system command execution. Available reporting indicates the issue is remotely reachable over HTTP and does not require authentication. Public exploit code has been disclosed, and multiple reports describe in-the-wild exploitation to deliver Mirai-family botnet payloads such as Nexcorium and other variants.

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary operating system commands on the vulnerable DVR. In observed campaigns, this has been used to download and execute shell scripts and multi-architecture malware payloads, establish persistence, conscript devices into botnets, and use them for distributed denial-of-service activity. Depending on the deployed payload, compromise can also enable device takeover, credential harvesting, propagation to other systems, and potential lateral movement from the affected IoT environment.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

Until patching or replacement is completed, remove affected DVRs from direct internet exposure, place them behind VPN-only administrative access, and enforce network segmentation to isolate them from critical systems. Block external access to the vulnerable web interface and monitor for exploitation attempts targeting /device.rsp?opt=sys&cmd=S_O_S_T_R_E_A_MAX. Inspect devices for signs of compromise, including unexpected downloader scripts, persistence changes, unknown binaries, outbound connections to suspicious infrastructure, and Mirai-like process behavior. Disable unnecessary remote administration and rotate any default or weak credentials present on adjacent services such as Telnet.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Apply the vendor patch if one is available for the affected TBK DVR-4104 and DVR-4216 models and firmware branch. If no supported fix is available, replace or retire affected end-of-life devices. Restrict or eliminate internet exposure to the vulnerable HTTP management interface, especially access to /device.rsp. Review vendor guidance for updated firmware and confirm remediation by testing that command injection via the vulnerable mdb/mdc parameters is no longer possible.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

Exploits

1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).

VALID 1 / 2 TOTALView more in app
Mirai-Based-CVE-2024-3721-SelfrepMaturityPoCVerified exploit

This repository contains a single C source file ('tbk.c') implementing a network-based exploit targeting embedded devices (likely TBK DVRs or similar IoT devices) with an HTTP service exposing a '/device.rsp' endpoint. The exploit operates as a scanner, establishing up to 256 concurrent TCP connections to random IP addresses (with some filtering to avoid reserved/private ranges) on port 80. For each connection, it attempts to send a crafted HTTP POST request to the '/device.rsp' endpoint, injecting a shell command that downloads and executes a binary ('arm7') from a remote server (92.246.90.22). The exploit is operational, as it automates both the scanning and exploitation process, and the payload provides remote code execution on the target. The code is self-contained but references some external headers (not included), likely for utility and randomization functions. The main attack vector is network-based, and the exploit is designed for mass exploitation of vulnerable IoT devices.

qalvynnDisclosed Nov 20, 2025cnetwork
EXPOSURE SURFACE

Affected products & vendors

Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.

VendorProductType
TbkvisionTbk-Dvr4104hardware
TbkvisionTbk-Dvr4216hardware

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What this page doesn’t show

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Exposure mapping

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Threat actor evidence5

Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.

Associated malware46

Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.

Detection signatures1

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Vendor-by-vendor mapping

Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.

Social activity63

Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.