Adobe Reader and Acrobat CoolType.dll SING Table Buffer Overflow
CVE-2010-2883 is a stack-based buffer overflow in CoolType.dll, the font parsing component used by Adobe Reader and Adobe Acrobat. The flaw affects Adobe Reader and Acrobat 9.x before 9.4 and 8.x before 8.2.5 on Windows and Mac OS X. The vulnerability is triggered when the application parses a malformed TrueType font embedded in a PDF document, specifically a long field in a Smart INdependent Glyphlets (SING) table. A specially crafted PDF can corrupt stack memory during font processing, leading to application crash or arbitrary code execution. The vulnerability was reported as exploited in the wild in September 2010.
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Impact
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Mitigation
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Remediation
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Exploits
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository contains a Metasploit exploit module targeting CVE-2010-2883, a stack buffer overflow in the SING table handling of Adobe Reader (versions 8.2.4 and 9.3.4, Windows). The main file, 'adobe_cooltype_sing_EMETBypass_calc.rb', is a Ruby Metasploit module that generates a malicious PDF file ('msf.pdf') containing a specially crafted TrueType font ('cve-2010-2883.ttf') to trigger the vulnerability. The exploit uses advanced techniques such as heap spraying, ROP chains, and bypasses for DEP/ASLR/EMET mitigations. The payload, defined in 'msf_calc_EMETBypass_payload.asm', is custom shellcode that launches calc.exe, demonstrating arbitrary code execution. The exploit is operational and demonstrates a real-world attack chain, but the payload is hardcoded (calc.exe). The repository is structured with a README, the main Metasploit module, and the assembly payload. No network endpoints are present; the attack vector is a malicious file (PDF) opened by the victim.
Affected products & vendors
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Recent activity
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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