HTTP header injection in BusyBox wget
BusyBox wget through version 1.3.7 improperly accepts raw carriage return (CR, 0x0D), line feed (LF, 0x0A), and other C0 control bytes in the HTTP request-target, i.e., the path or query portion of an outbound HTTP request. Because these bytes are not rejected, an attacker-controlled request-target can split the HTTP request line and inject arbitrary headers while preserving the expected HTTP/1.1 request-line structure. The provided context also notes that raw spaces (0x20) in the request-target must be rejected to preserve the METHOD SP request-target SP HTTP/1.1 format, with clients expected to use percent-encoding such as %20 instead. In effect, this is an HTTP request construction flaw in BusyBox wget that enables request-line splitting and header injection.
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