Android CallRedirectionProcessor permission bypass leading to local privilege escalation
CVE-2023-40130 is an Android System elevation-of-privilege vulnerability in the CallRedirectionProcessor component. According to the provided description, the flaw exists in notifyTimeout and is caused by a logic error that results in a permission bypass. Successful exploitation can allow a local attacker to trigger background activity launch and achieve local escalation of privilege without requiring additional execution privileges. User interaction is not required.
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Impact
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Mitigation
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Remediation
Patch, then assume compromise.
Exploits
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is an Android proof-of-concept (POC) application demonstrating a technique to start an activity from the background by chaining a CallRedirectionService and a JobService. The core Java files are BgService.java, MyCallRedirectionService.java, MainActivity.java, and TestActivity.java. The exploit works by requesting the call redirection role, then, upon a call event, the MyCallRedirectionService schedules a job (via JobScheduler) that runs BgService. BgService then attempts to start TestActivity from the background using both direct startActivity and PendingIntent.send(). This approach is designed to test or potentially bypass Android's restrictions on background activity launches introduced in recent Android versions (API 31+). The manifest declares the necessary permissions and exports the relevant services. The repository is structured as a standard Android Studio project, with supporting Gradle build files and resource XMLs. No hardcoded network endpoints or external IPs are present; the attack vector is local, requiring the app to be installed and granted the appropriate permissions and roles.
Affected products & vendors
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Recent activity
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
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Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.
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