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Mallory
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Arbitrary Physical Memory Access in WinRing0.sys / WinRing0x64.sys

IdentifiersCVE-2020-14979CWE-284

WinRing0.sys and WinRing0x64.sys version 1.2.0, as shipped with EVGA Precision X1 through 1.0.6, expose functionality that allows local users, including low-integrity processes, to read from and write to arbitrary memory locations. The vulnerable driver can be reached from user mode, including via the named pipe \.\WinRing0_1_2_0 referenced in reporting, and insufficiently restricts privileged operations. As described in the provided content, this permits mapping of \Device\PhysicalMemory into the calling process, enabling direct access to physical memory from an unprivileged context. Because the driver runs in kernel mode, this behavior can be abused as a Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) primitive to cross the user/kernel boundary and obtain full system compromise.

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation allows a local attacker to bypass normal Windows privilege boundaries and escalate privileges to NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. In practical terms, the arbitrary physical memory access primitive can be used to obtain Ring 0/kernel-level capabilities, tamper with kernel memory, disable or evade security controls, access sensitive data, and facilitate follow-on actions such as persistence, credential theft, process manipulation, or loading additional malicious components. The provided reporting specifically notes abuse of this driver by malware to gain SYSTEM privileges and kernel access.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

If immediate patching or removal is not possible, restrict local code execution opportunities, especially for untrusted or low-integrity processes, because exploitation is local. Enforce application control and the Microsoft vulnerable driver blocklist to prevent loading of WinRing0.sys/WinRing0x64.sys. Monitor for creation/loading of the driver, related services, and communication with \.\WinRing0_1_2_0. Reduce BYOVD exposure by blocking unsigned or unapproved kernel drivers, limiting administrator rights, and detecting attempts to access physical memory or install legacy hardware-access drivers.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade or remove affected software components that install WinRing0.sys or WinRing0x64.sys version 1.2.0, including vulnerable EVGA Precision X1 versions through 1.0.6. Prevent the vulnerable driver from loading by applying vendor fixes where available, uninstalling the affected driver, and using Microsoft’s Vulnerable Driver Blocklist or Windows Defender Application Control policies to block known-bad signed drivers. Review systems for the presence of WinRing0.sys/WinRing0x64.sys and associated service or pipe artifacts, and remove unauthorized copies dropped by third-party software or malware.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

Exploits

No valid public exploits. Mallory filtered out 1 candidate as fakes, detection scripts, or README-only repos.

VALID 0 / 1 TOTALView more in app

All candidate exploits were filtered out by Mallory's validation.

EXPOSURE SURFACE

Affected products & vendors

Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.

VendorProductType
EvgaPrecision X1application
Winring0 ProjectWinring0application

Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.

What this page doesn’t show

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Exposure mapping

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Threat actor evidence

Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.

Associated malware2

Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Vendor-by-vendor mapping

Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.

Social activity3

Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.