Arbitrary Process Termination via IOCTL in K7RKScan.sys
K7RKScan.sys version 23.0.0.10, a kernel driver shipped with the K7 Security Anti-Malware suite, contains insufficient caller validation in its IOCTL handler. An administrator-privileged local user can send crafted IOCTL requests to the driver and invoke kernel-space functionality to terminate processes that are protected by a third-party protection implementation. The issue stems from the driver trusting the caller for sensitive process-control operations without enforcing adequate authorization checks on who may request them. As a result, a local attacker can abuse the signed driver as a BYOVD-style primitive to kill protected processes and disrupt security or other critical software.
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Impact
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Exploits
1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.
This repository is a collection of operational Proof-of-Concept (PoC) exploits demonstrating the Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) technique to kill protected processes on Windows systems. Each subdirectory targets a specific vulnerable driver, with a Rust-based executable that loads the driver as a service, opens a device handle, and sends a crafted IOCTL to terminate a process by name or PID. The exploits require the vulnerable driver file to be present in the same directory as the executable and are designed for local execution with administrative privileges. The repository covers multiple drivers, including those from Baidu Antivirus (BdApiUtil64.sys, CVE-2024-51324), K7 Ultimate Security (K7RKScan.sys, CVE-2025-52915, CVE-2025-1055), ThreatFire System Monitor (sysmon.sys), Tg Soft (viragt64.sys), and Topaz Antifraud (wsftprm.sys, CVE-2023-52271). The main entry points are the Rust 'main.rs' files in each subdirectory. The exploits are not detection scripts but provide real process termination capability, which can be used to disable AV/EDR or other security software. The code is well-structured, modular, and leverages Windows service and device APIs to interact with the drivers. The attack vector is local, requiring administrative access to load the driver. The endpoints include the driver files and their respective device interfaces (e.g., \\.\BdApiUtil, \\.\ksapi64_dev, etc.). This collection is intended for research and educational purposes to demonstrate the risks of unprotected or vulnerable kernel drivers on Windows platforms.
Recent activity
6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
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