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Mallory
HighPublic exploit

Notepad++ v8.8.3 DLL Hijacking

IdentifiersCVE-2025-56383CWE-427· Uncontrolled Search Path Element

Notepad++ v8.8.3 was reported as having a DLL hijacking issue in which a malicious DLL can be substituted for a legitimately expected library and then loaded by the application, resulting in execution of attacker-controlled code. The available content does not identify the specific DLL name or vulnerable code path, but the described behavior is consistent with a Windows DLL search-order weakness / uncontrolled search path condition. The CVE is explicitly disputed by multiple parties because the behavior reportedly manifests only when the user installs Notepad++ into a directory tree that is writable by arbitrary unprivileged users, which many consider an insecure deployment condition rather than a product defect.

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

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Impact

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If the condition is reachable, an attacker who can place a crafted DLL in the relevant search path can cause Notepad++ to load and execute malicious code in the context of the user launching the application. This can enable local code execution, persistence via repeated application launches, and follow-on actions available to that user context. Based on the provided content, there is no evidence of remote unauthenticated exploitation or privilege escalation by itself. The practical impact is therefore dependent on the insecure installation location and the attacker's ability to write files there.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

Do not install Notepad++ in user-writable or broadly writable directories. Restrict filesystem ACLs so unprivileged users cannot add or replace DLLs in the application directory or other searched paths. Prefer standard protected installation paths, monitor for unexpected DLLs adjacent to the executable, and use application control / code integrity policies where feasible to prevent unauthorized DLL loading.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

The provided content states that the Notepad++ development team is not planning to address the issue and that the CVE is disputed. No vendor remediation details are provided. Based on the described condition, the effective remediation is to avoid installing Notepad++ into directory trees writable by arbitrary unprivileged users and to ensure application binaries reside in appropriately permission-restricted locations.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

Exploits

1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.

VALID 1 / 1 TOTALView more in app
CVE-2025-56383-Proof-of-ConceptMaturityPoCVerified exploit

This repository demonstrates a DLL hijacking vulnerability in Notepad++ v8.8.3, specifically targeting the NppExport plugin DLL (NppExport.dll). The exploit consists of a proof-of-concept C source file (poc.c) that builds a malicious DLL. This DLL forwards all required exports to the original DLL (original-NppExport.dll) but also executes arbitrary code (in this case, displaying a message box) when loaded by Notepad++. The README provides detailed instructions on replacing the legitimate DLL with the malicious one to achieve code execution when Notepad++ is launched. The attack vector is local, requiring the attacker to have the ability to replace files on the target system. The repository contains two files: a README with exploitation instructions and a C source file for the malicious DLL payload.

zer0t0Disclosed Sep 26, 2025clocal
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