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Mallory
HighPublic exploit

runc procfs write redirection and LSM bypass

IdentifiersCVE-2025-52881CWE-367

CVE-2025-52881 is a race-condition vulnerability in runc, the OCI container runtime, that allows an attacker to trick runc into redirecting writes intended for procfs files to unintended procfs targets. The issue affects runc 1.2.7, 1.3.2, and 1.4.0-rc.2, and broader reporting describes it as affecting all known versions prior to the fixed releases. Exploitation relies on a racing container with shared mounts so that, during runc's handling of writes to /proc, the attacker can cause path resolution to be redirected via symlinks in tmpfs or potentially bind mounts. The flaw is particularly relevant to writes associated with Linux Security Module relabeling and sysctl handling. The vulnerability is described as a more sophisticated variant of CVE-2019-19921 because the earlier mitigation only verified that certain LSM-label writes targeted procfs, which was insufficient to prevent redirected-write abuse. Successful exploitation can transform ordinary runc writes into attacker-controlled writes to sensitive procfs files such as /proc/sysrq-trigger or /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern.

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

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Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation can bypass or neuter LSM protections such as AppArmor and SELinux in affected scenarios, redirect runc-mediated writes to sensitive host procfs files, and enable host-level denial of service or full container escape. Reported impacts include crashing or hanging the host via /proc/sysrq-trigger and achieving host-root code execution or container breakout by rewriting /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern. The vulnerability also provides a semi-arbitrary write primitive within procfs, which can be combined with other weaknesses to escalate from container control to host compromise.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

If immediate patching is not possible, reduce exposure by avoiding untrusted container images and Dockerfiles, especially those that can trigger parallel container execution with custom shared mounts. Prefer rootless containers and user namespaces so runc runs without host-root privileges and dangerous procfs writes are blocked by normal DAC constraints. Run containers as non-root where possible and enable noNewPrivileges. LSMs may provide limited protection for some variants, but the available reporting indicates common AppArmor and SELinux profiles do not reliably stop the more dangerous redirected-write cases, so they should not be treated as a complete mitigation.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade runc to a fixed version: 1.2.8, 1.3.3, or 1.4.0-rc.3 or later. Apply the upstream patchset for safer procfs handling and secure path resolution. Where the deployment uses the related SELinux components referenced by the advisory, update github.com/opencontainers/selinux to 1.13.0 or later. Replace or rebuild affected container hosts, node images, and runtime packages so newly launched containers use the patched runtime.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

Exploits

No valid public exploits. Mallory filtered out 2 candidates as fakes, detection scripts, or README-only repos.

VALID 0 / 2 TOTALView more in app

All candidate exploits were filtered out by Mallory's validation.

EXPOSURE SURFACE

Affected products & vendors

Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.

VendorProductType
Amazon Web ServicesAmazon Linuxoperating_system
Linux FoundationRuncapplication
OpencontainersRuncapplication

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