Cleartext MQTT transmission in YoSmart/YoLink ecosystem
Information is currently not available beyond the provided high-level advisory summary. The available content indicates that components of the YoSmart YoLink ecosystem (through 2025-10-02) use unencrypted MQTT over the internet, allowing an on-path/traffic-monitoring attacker to observe and potentially tamper with MQTT traffic. Affected components called out include the YoLink Mobile Application (noted 1.40.41; advisory indicates <1.40.45) and the YoLink MQTT Broker. The vendor disputes impact to Hub hardware/firmware, stating the Hub acts only as a transparent LoRa gateway and does not inspect/process application-layer data.
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