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Mallory
HighPublic exploit

DLL hijacking (TextShaping.dll) in FileZilla Client 3.63.1

IdentifiersCVE-2023-53959CWE-427· Uncontrolled Search Path Element

FileZilla Client 3.63.1 for Windows is vulnerable to DLL search order hijacking due to an uncontrolled search path element. When FileZilla launches, it attempts to load a DLL named TextShaping.dll from the application directory. An attacker who can place a crafted/malicious TextShaping.dll in the FileZilla installation/application directory can cause FileZilla to load and execute attacker-controlled code on startup, resulting in arbitrary code execution in the context of the user running FileZilla.

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation results in arbitrary code execution when FileZilla Client is launched (commonly described as RCE). This can be used to run attacker payloads such as a reverse shell, enabling full compromise of the affected user context and follow-on actions consistent with that access level.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

Protect the FileZilla application/installation directory from unprivileged writes to prevent placement of a malicious TextShaping.dll. Avoid installing/running software from untrusted sources and avoid executing FileZilla from directories where attackers can write files. Where feasible, use OS/application controls that prevent unsigned/untrusted DLL loading in user-writable paths.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Update FileZilla Client to a version that addresses the DLL hijacking issue (i.e., a release where the DLL search path/loading behavior is corrected and/or the required DLL is properly bundled/loaded securely).
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

Exploits

No public exploits tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.

VALID 0 / 0 TOTALView more in app

No public exploit code observed for this vulnerability.

EXPOSURE SURFACE

Affected products & vendors

Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.

VendorProductType
Filezilla-ProjectFilezilla Clientapplication

Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.

What this page doesn’t show

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Exposure mapping

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Threat actor evidence

Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.

Associated malware

Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Vendor-by-vendor mapping

Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.

Social activity4

Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.