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Mallory
HighPublic exploit

pnpm lockfile integrity bypass for HTTP/git tarball dependencies

IdentifiersCVE-2025-69263CWE-353

In pnpm versions 10.26.2 and below, HTTP/HTTPS tarball dependencies (and git-hosted tarballs) are recorded in the pnpm lockfile without integrity hashes. As a result, even when a lockfile is committed, pnpm cannot verify that the fetched tarball content matches a previously-resolved artifact. A remote server hosting the tarball can therefore serve different content on different installs while still satisfying the same lockfile entry, enabling a lockfile integrity bypass for URL/git tarball dependencies.

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

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Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Supply-chain compromise risk: an attacker controlling (or able to influence) the remote tarball content can deliver different dependency payloads to different victims/CI runs (e.g., targeted malicious code, time-based/conditional payloads, audit evasion) despite the presence of a committed lockfile, because pnpm lacks integrity verification for these dependency types in affected versions.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

Avoid or minimize HTTP/HTTPS tarball URL dependencies and git-hosted tarball dependencies in pnpm dependency trees; prefer registry-published packages that include integrity metadata. Until pnpm is upgraded, treat projects that include URL/git tarball dependencies as effectively unpinned for those artifacts, and enforce network egress controls/allowlisting for dependency fetches in CI/CD to limit exposure to arbitrary tarball hosts.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade pnpm to 10.26.0 or later, which adds/fixes integrity handling for HTTP/HTTPS tarball and git-hosted tarball dependencies so lockfiles can provide integrity protection for these artifacts.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

Exploits

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VALID 0 / 0 TOTALView more in app

No public exploit code observed for this vulnerability.

EXPOSURE SURFACE

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PnpmPnpmapplication

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