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Windows Kerberos RC4 Service Ticket Information Disclosure

IdentifiersCVE-2026-20833CWE-327· Use of a Broken or Risky…

CVE-2026-20833 is an information disclosure vulnerability in Windows Kerberos caused by continued use of weak or legacy cryptographic algorithms, specifically RC4, during Kerberos service ticket issuance for accounts that do not have explicit Active Directory encryption type settings. Microsoft states that an authorized attacker can obtain service tickets encrypted with weak algorithms such as RC4 and perform offline attacks to recover service account passwords. The issue affects Kerberos Key Distribution Center behavior on Windows domain controllers when issuing service tickets. Microsoft’s mitigation guidance ties the fix to changing the default DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes behavior so that, for accounts lacking an explicit msds-SupportedEncryptionTypes attribute, only AES-SHA1-encrypted tickets are supported by default.

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation allows an authorized local attacker to disclose sensitive information by recovering service account passwords through offline cryptanalysis of weakly encrypted Kerberos service tickets. Compromise of service account credentials can in turn expose additional domain resources and enable follow-on abuse under the context and privileges of the recovered account.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

Audit domain controllers for RC4 dependencies using the documented Kdcsvc event IDs (including 201-205 and related events) after installing the updates. Identify service accounts and applications still relying on RC4 and migrate them to AES-capable configurations. If RC4 is temporarily required for compatibility, explicitly enable it only on the specific service accounts that must accept RC4 by setting the appropriate msds-SupportedEncryptionTypes bitmask, rather than relying on insecure defaults. Monitor for insecure DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes configurations and correct them before enforcement blocks weak connections.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Install Windows updates released on or after 2026-01-13 on applicable Windows Server systems acting as Active Directory domain controllers. Per Microsoft guidance, full remediation is not achieved by patch installation alone in all phases; organizations should move domain controllers to enforcement mode as soon as possible and adopt the hardened Kerberos defaults. Ensure DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes is configured to use AES-SHA1 only for accounts without explicit encryption settings, and explicitly configure msds-SupportedEncryptionTypes on service accounts where necessary. Microsoft’s phased rollout indicates the default DDSET value changes to AES-SHA1 only (0x18), with later removal of the temporary RC4DefaultDisablementPhase registry control.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

Exploits

No valid public exploits. Mallory filtered out 1 candidate as fakes, detection scripts, or README-only repos.

VALID 0 / 1 TOTALView more in app

All candidate exploits were filtered out by Mallory's validation.

EXPOSURE SURFACE

Affected products & vendors

Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.

VendorProductType
Microsoft CorporationWindows Server 2008operating_system
Microsoft CorporationWindows Server 2008 R2operating_system
Microsoft CorporationWindows Server 2008 Sp2operating_system
Microsoft CorporationWindows Server 2012operating_system
Microsoft CorporationWindows Server 2012 R2operating_system
Microsoft CorporationWindows Server 2016operating_system
Microsoft CorporationWindows Server 2019operating_system
Microsoft CorporationWindows Server 2022operating_system
Microsoft CorporationWindows Server 2022 23h2operating_system
Microsoft CorporationWindows Server 2025operating_system
Microsoft CorporationWindows Server 23h2operating_system

Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

cyber security newsNews
Apr 17, 2026
Microsoft Confirms Windows Servers Enter Reboot Loops Following April Patches

A vulnerability associated with the Kerberos protocol in Windows Server 2025 that is addressed by changing the default DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypes value to AES-SHA1 for accounts without explicit Active Directory encryption type definitions.

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microsoft supportNews
Apr 14, 2026
April 14, 2026-KB5082142 (OS Build 20348.5020) - Microsoft Support

A vulnerability related to Kerberos KDC usage of RC4 for service account ticket issuance, addressed by changing default encryption behavior to leverage AES-SHA1 when explicit encryption types are not defined.

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microsoft msrc blogNews
Jan 25, 2026
2026 年 1 月のセキュリティ更新プログラム (月例)

Kerberos認証に関する脆弱性。Microsoftは段階的にRC4を廃止することで影響低減/対処を進めるとしている(KBガイダンスあり)。

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microsoft supportNews
Feb 3, 2026
CVE-2026-20833 に関連するサービス アカウント チケット発行の変更に対する RC4 の Kerberos KDC 使用量を管理する方法 - Microsoft サポート

Windows Active Directory ドメイン コントローラーの Kerberos において、RC4 などのレガシ暗号で発行されたサービスチケットを攻撃者が入手できると、オフライン解析によりサービスアカウントのパスワード回復につながり得る情報漏えい/弱暗号起因の脆弱性。更新により既定の暗号スイートを AES-SHA1 のみに寄せ、段階的に強制(ブロック)へ移行する。

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What this page doesn’t show

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Exposure mapping

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Threat actor evidence

Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.

Associated malware

Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Vendor-by-vendor mapping

Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.

Social activity3

Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.