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Pre-authenticated RCE in EnOcean SmartServer IoT LON IP-852 message handling

IdentifiersCVE-2026-20761CWE-77· Improper Neutralization of Special…

CVE-2026-20761 is a pre-authentication remote command execution vulnerability affecting EnOcean SmartServer IoT version 4.60.009 and earlier, and reportedly legacy i.LON devices implementing the same IP-852/LonTalk functionality. The flaw is in handling of LON IP-852 management messages, specifically the timezone-setting path. According to the provided analysis, the vulnerable function is LtSetTimeZone in libLonStack.so, which constructs a shell command from a supplied timezone string and invokes system() with root privileges. LtSetTimeZone is reached from LtIpMaster::doRFCin while processing the proprietary PKTTYPE_ECHCONFIG (0xF3) packet. By sending a specially crafted IP-852 management message containing a malicious timezone value, a remote attacker can inject shell metacharacters and cause arbitrary OS command execution on the device.

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

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Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation allows arbitrary OS command execution on the affected device. The provided context states this can yield full takeover of the Linux-based controller with root privileges, enabling compromise of building management and automation logic, disruption or manipulation of HVAC, power, and environmental systems, and potential lateral movement toward connected field devices. The issue is remotely exploitable and described as affecting internet-exposed devices with IP-852 enabled in particular.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

Until patched, minimize or eliminate exposure of the LON IP-852 management interface to untrusted networks, especially the public internet. Restrict access to the IP-852 service to authorized management hosts only using network segmentation, firewalls, and allowlisting. Place control-system networks behind firewalls and isolate them from business networks. If remote administration is required, use secured VPN-based access rather than direct exposure. Monitor for anomalous or unexpected IP-852 management traffic, including crafted PKTTYPE_ECHCONFIG messages.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade EnOcean SmartServer IoT to SmartServer 4.6 Update 2 (version 4.60.023) or later, which the provided content states addresses this vulnerability. Replace or otherwise remediate affected legacy i.LON devices if they share the vulnerable implementation and no supported fixed firmware is available. Validate that exposed IP-852 management functionality is updated across all deployed controllers.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

Exploits

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VALID 0 / 0 TOTALView more in app

No public exploit code observed for this vulnerability.

EXPOSURE SURFACE

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VendorProductType
EnOceanSmartserver Iothardware

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Threat actor evidence

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Associated malware

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Detection signatures

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Vendor-by-vendor mapping

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Social activity3

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