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Wi‑Fi deauthentication/disassociation DoS in PUSR USR-W610 due to missing 802.11w PMF/MFP

IdentifiersCVE-2026-26048CWE-306· Missing Authentication for…

CVE-2026-26048 affects Jinan USR IOT Technology Limited (PUSR) USR-W610 Wi‑Fi router firmware versions up to and including 3.1.1.0. The device lacks Wi‑Fi Management Frame Protection / Protected Management Frames (IEEE 802.11w), allowing an attacker to forge and broadcast deauthentication and disassociation 802.11 management frames without authentication or encryption. This enables unauthorized client disconnects and service disruption (wireless denial of service).

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

A network-adjacent attacker can repeatedly spoof deauthentication/disassociation frames to force wireless clients off the AP, causing sustained loss of connectivity and denial of service for impacted Wi‑Fi users/services (availability impact).

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

Enable IEEE 802.11w PMF/MFP (preferably “required”) if supported. If PMF cannot be enabled, reduce wireless DoS exposure by minimizing Wi‑Fi coverage (TX power/antenna placement), monitoring for abnormal deauth/disassoc rates, segmenting critical services off Wi‑Fi, and following CISA guidance to minimize network exposure and isolate control/remote networks behind firewalls and from business networks.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade/replace with firmware/model that supports and enables IEEE 802.11w Protected Management Frames / Management Frame Protection (PMF/MFP), and apply vendor firmware updates when available. Validate PMF operation with compatible clients and set PMF to “required” where possible.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

Exploits

No public exploits tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.

VALID 0 / 0 TOTALView more in app

No public exploit code observed for this vulnerability.

EXPOSURE SURFACE

Affected products & vendors

Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.

VendorProductType
AnyWi-Fi Routerhardware

Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

3 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.

No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

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Exposure mapping

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Threat actor evidence

Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.

Associated malware

Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Vendor-by-vendor mapping

Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.

Social activity2

Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.