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Authentication Bypass in OpenClaw @openclaw/voice-call Telnyx Webhook Verification

IdentifiersCVE-2026-26319CWE-306· Missing Authentication for…

CVE-2026-26319 affects OpenClaw versions 2026.2.13 and earlier in deployments using the optional @openclaw/voice-call plugin. The vulnerability is in the Telnyx webhook handling path, where inbound webhook requests are expected to be authenticated using Ed25519 signature verification. In affected versions, TelnyxProvider.verifyWebhook() could effectively fail open when telnyx.publicKey was not configured, causing the application to accept unsigned inbound webhook requests as if they were legitimate Telnyx events. As a result, arbitrary HTTP POST requests sent to the voice-call webhook endpoint could be processed as trusted Telnyx-originated events. The issue only affects deployments where the Voice Call plugin is installed and enabled and where the webhook endpoint is reachable by an attacker, such as when exposed through a public tunnel or proxy. The vulnerability was fixed in OpenClaw version 2026.2.14.

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

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Impact

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An unauthenticated attacker able to reach the exposed voice-call webhook endpoint can forge Telnyx webhook events without possessing a valid Telnyx signing key or generating a valid Ed25519 signature. This can allow unauthorized triggering of call-related or workflow actions that depend on webhook events, undermining trust in the telephony integration and enabling authentication bypass at the webhook boundary. The precise downstream impact depends on how the affected deployment processes Telnyx events, but it includes unauthorized event injection into the voice-call workflow.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

Configure Telnyx webhook signature verification by setting telnyx.publicKey or TELNYX_PUBLIC_KEY in all environments handling real traffic. Do not use skipSignatureVerification in production; if present, reserve it strictly for local development and testing. Reduce exposure of the voice-call webhook endpoint by avoiding unnecessary public tunnels or proxies and by restricting inbound access to trusted sources where possible.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade OpenClaw to version 2026.2.14 or later, which fixes the fail-open behavior in the Telnyx webhook verification path. Additionally, ensure the Telnyx public key is properly configured via plugins.entries.voice-call.config.telnyx.publicKey or the TELNYX_PUBLIC_KEY environment variable so webhook signature verification is enforced. Do not rely on deployments where signature verification can be bypassed due to missing configuration.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

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VALID 0 / 0 TOTALView more in app

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