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Mallory
MediumPublic exploit

Integrity validation bypass in CPSD CryptoPro Secure Disk pre-boot Linux environment

IdentifiersCVE-2025-10010CWE-353· Missing Support for Integrity Check

CVE-2025-10010 affects CPSD CryptoPro Secure Disk for BitLocker, which uses a small Linux-based pre-boot authentication (PBA) environment on a separate unencrypted partition before invoking BitLocker to decrypt the Windows partition. Multiple integrity checks are performed at boot, including Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA), but certain configuration files are not validated by IMA and may not be covered by other integrity controls. As a result, an attacker with access to the disk can modify unvalidated configuration files in the PBA environment and cause arbitrary code execution as root during boot. SEC Consult reported a proof of concept using DHCP-related hook scripting such as /etc/dhcpcd.enter-hook to obtain a reverse shell with root privileges after restart. Because the vulnerable environment runs before or during access to the protected Windows volume, the issue can be used to implant a backdoor and access data during execution.

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

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Impact

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Successful exploitation allows arbitrary code execution as root in the CryptoPro Secure Disk pre-boot Linux environment. This enables persistent tampering of the PBA environment, including planting backdoors, intercepting or manipulating pre-boot operations, and accessing data during execution in the phase where the product is used to unlock the BitLocker-protected Windows partition. Given the pre-boot position of the vulnerable component, compromise undermines the trust boundary intended to protect disk decryption and can facilitate unauthorized access to protected data.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

As a workaround, enable encryption of the PBA Linux partition so an attacker cannot trivially modify files offline; the advisory notes this is available since version 7.6.0 via the client setting "PBA Linux Partition verschlüsseln" and is enabled by default starting with version 7.7. Additionally, restrict physical access to endpoints and storage media, prevent booting from external media where possible, and use platform controls such as UEFI Secure Boot, firmware passwords, and disabled removable boot options to reduce opportunities for offline partition tampering.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade to a fixed version provided by the vendor. The advisory states the issue is fixed in CPSD CryptoPro Secure Disk for BitLocker versions 7.6.6 and 7.7.1. The remediation should ensure that configuration files in the PBA environment are covered by integrity verification or equivalent cryptographic validation. After patching, affected systems should be reviewed for offline tampering and re-provisioned or rebuilt as needed to remove any implanted backdoors from the pre-boot partition.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

Exploits

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VALID 0 / 0 TOTALView more in app

No public exploit code observed for this vulnerability.

EXPOSURE SURFACE

Affected products & vendors

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VendorProductType
CpsdCryptopro Secure Diskapplication

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