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Mallory
HighPublic exploit

Docker/Moby AuthZ Plugin Authorization Bypass

IdentifiersCVE-2026-34040CWE-288· Authentication Bypass Using an…

CVE-2026-34040 is a high-severity authorization bypass vulnerability in Docker Engine / Moby affecting versions prior to 29.3.1 when authorization plugins (AuthZ) are in use. The flaw is in the middleware path between the Docker API and AuthZ plugins: a specially crafted oversized API request body can be dropped or not forwarded to the authorization plugin, while the Docker daemon still processes the full request body. As a result, an AuthZ plugin that relies on inspecting the request body for policy decisions may approve a request it would otherwise deny. Public reporting describes this as an incomplete fix for CVE-2024-41110 and notes exploitation via padded HTTP requests larger than 1 MB, enabling restricted container-creation parameters such as privileged mode or other disallowed settings to bypass policy enforcement.

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation allows a caller with Docker API access to evade authorization controls enforced by AuthZ plugins and perform otherwise prohibited Docker actions. Reported impacts include creating privileged containers, mounting the host filesystem, and obtaining effective root-level access to host resources through container configuration that should have been blocked. This can lead to compromise of sensitive data and credentials present on the host, including cloud credentials, SSH keys, database secrets, Kubernetes tokens/configuration, and other assets accessible from the mounted host environment. The issue primarily affects environments that depend on AuthZ plugins for request-body-based access control.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

If immediate patching is not possible, restrict Docker API access to only trusted principals and minimize exposure of the daemon socket or remote API. Avoid relying on AuthZ plugins that make security decisions based on request-body inspection until patched versions are deployed. Apply least privilege to Docker API users, and use hardening measures such as rootless mode or user namespace remapping to reduce host-impact if exploitation occurs. Monitor Docker daemon logs and recent container creation events for anomalous oversized requests, privileged container launches, or unexpected host mounts.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade Docker Engine / Moby to version 29.3.1 or later. Vendor reporting indicates the fix includes changes to request-body handling in the AuthZ path, including increasing the body threshold, rejecting oversized requests instead of allowing the daemon to process them without plugin inspection, and removing the drainBody() behavior implicated in the bypass. Review the vendor advisory and release notes for the exact patched build applicable to your deployment.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

Exploits

1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.

VALID 1 / 1 TOTALView more in app
CVE-2026-34040-PoCMaturityPoCVerified exploit

This repository is a Python-based full lab PoC for CVE-2026-34040, targeting Docker/Moby AuthZ plugin bypass behavior when a Docker API request body exceeds 1 MB. The repository is small and focused: one executable script (poc.py), a standard-library-only requirements file, and several Markdown documents covering setup, demo flow, impact modes, troubleshooting, and publication notes. The main exploit logic is in poc.py. It manually crafts raw HTTP requests over the local UNIX socket /var/run/docker.sock rather than using the Docker SDK. The key capability is sending a container creation request with oversized JSON label padding ("padding" = "A" * (1024*1024+1)) so that an AuthZ plugin may fail to inspect the body while the Docker daemon still processes the original request. The script compares a normal request against an oversized one in check mode to determine whether the bypass is observable, expecting small requests to be blocked (HTTP 403) and oversized requests to reach daemon processing (HTTP 201 or possibly HTTP 404 if the image is missing). Beyond detection, the PoC includes multiple post-bypass impact modes. These include reading host files by creating a privileged container with the host root mounted read-only, writing a proof marker file on the host via chroot, executing user-supplied host commands in a lab, creating a long-lived privileged container for manual docker exec and chroot interaction, and a local-only reverse shell mode restricted to 127.0.0.1/localhost. The README and docs explicitly describe that the vulnerability itself is an authorization bypass, while file read and command execution are downstream impacts enabled by privileged container creation plus host bind mounts. Repository structure: README.md explains the vulnerability model, usage, and safety notes; docs/lab-setup.md lists prerequisites such as vulnerable Docker/Moby, AuthZ plugin, docker.sock access, and local alpine image; docs/impact-modes.md and docs/demo-script.md describe each demonstration path; docs/troubleshooting.md covers common failures like missing image or socket permissions. Overall, this is a real exploit PoC for local lab use, not merely a detector, and it is operational because it contains working payload paths for host file access and host command execution.

m0nk3ygodDisclosed Jun 7, 2026pythonmarkdownlocalcontainernetwork
EXPOSURE SURFACE

Affected products & vendors

Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.

VendorProductType
DockerDockerapplication
DockerEngineapplication
MobyMobyapplication
MobyprojectMobyapplication

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Associated malware1

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