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Mallory
CriticalPublic exploit

Apache Camel camel-coap CoAP query header injection leading to RCE

IdentifiersCVE-2026-33453CWE-915· Improperly Controlled Modification…

CVE-2026-33453 is a high-severity vulnerability in the Apache Camel camel-coap component caused by improper control over dynamically determined object attributes. The flaw exists because camel-coap maps incoming CoAP URI query parameters directly into Camel Exchange In headers without applying a HeaderFilterStrategy. Specifically, CamelCoapResource.handleRequest() iterates over OptionSet.getUriQuery() and calls camelExchange.getIn().setHeader(...) for each query parameter, while the component does not use the header-filtering endpoint/component patterns used elsewhere. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to send a crafted CoAP request to a route consuming from coap:// and inject arbitrary Camel internal headers, including Camel* headers. If the route forwards the exchange to header-sensitive producers such as camel-exec, camel-sql, camel-bean, camel-file, camel-freemarker, or camel-velocity, the injected headers can alter downstream behavior. In the camel-exec case, CamelExecCommandExecutable and CamelExecCommandArgs can override the configured executable and arguments, resulting in arbitrary OS command execution in the security context of the Camel process. The producer output is then written back into the Exchange body and returned in the CoAP response, enabling an interactive pre-authentication RCE path.

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation allows unauthenticated remote attackers to inject arbitrary Camel headers into exchanges originating from camel-coap endpoints and, in vulnerable route topologies, to control downstream producer behavior. Where routes forward to camel-exec, this can yield arbitrary operating system command execution under the privileges of the Camel runtime. Because command output may be returned in the CoAP response payload, the attacker can obtain an interactive command-execution channel without requiring separate exfiltration infrastructure. Depending on the downstream producer used, exploitation may also enable unauthorized file operations, template manipulation, bean invocation, SQL-related abuse, or other application-specific impacts.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

If immediate patching is not possible, restrict network access to CoAP endpoints, especially unauthenticated UDP/5683 exposure, using ACLs, segmentation, VPNs, or equivalent controls. Avoid routing exchanges originating from camel-coap directly into header-sensitive producers such as camel-exec, camel-sql, camel-bean, camel-file, camel-freemarker, and camel-velocity unless headers are explicitly filtered or normalized first. Implement defensive route logic to drop or sanitize untrusted Camel* and producer-control headers before forwarding. Where feasible, enable transport security/authentication for CoAP deployments and disable unnecessary CoAP listeners.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade Apache Camel camel-coap to a fixed release. The provided content indicates fixed versions include 4.14.6 for the 4.14.x line, 4.18.1 for the 4.18.x line, and 4.19.0 or later fixed releases depending on branch. Apply the vendor-supported patched version appropriate to the deployed stream and redeploy affected integrations. Review routes that ingest data from coap:// endpoints and verify that untrusted request metadata cannot reach header-sensitive producers without explicit filtering or sanitization.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

Exploits

2 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.

VALID 2 / 2 TOTALView more in app
CVE-2026-33453MaturityPoCVerified exploit

Repository contains a multi-PoC assessment for three Apache Camel 4.18.0 vulnerabilities, not a framework module. Structure is split into per-CVE Java applications under poc/cve-2026-33453-coap, poc/cve-2026-40473-mina, and poc/cve-2026-40858-infinispan; a docker-compose lab that exposes the vulnerable services; and three Python exploit scripts under poc/exploits. README.md and EXPLOITS-REPORT.md document root cause, attack flow, and reproduction steps. Main exploit capabilities: - CVE-2026-33453: exploit_cve_2026_33453_coap.py crafts raw CoAP UDP packets and injects CamelExecCommandExecutable/CamelExecCommandArgs as URI query parameters to override camel-exec behavior on /api/status. It is a direct unauthenticated network RCE PoC and parses CoAP responses to display command output. - CVE-2026-40473: exploit_cve_2026_40473_mina.py targets MINA TCP endpoints, especially raw TCP on 9879, and uses ysoserial-generated gadget chains for unsafe Java deserialization. It includes a callback listener to capture command output via HTTP POST/curl from the victim. The Java helper MinaGadgetGenerator builds MINA-compatible serialized gadget bytes, and MinaTestPayload validates wire compatibility. - CVE-2026-40858: exploit_cve_2026_40858_infinispan.py builds a Hot Rod PUT request to write malicious serialized bytes into an Infinispan cache entry used by Camel aggregation. This is a delayed-trigger exploit: code execution occurs when Camel later deserializes the cached object. It can use ysoserial if available or a demo serialized object otherwise. Repository purpose: to demonstrate exploitability of three claimed Apache Camel 4.18.0 issues in a controlled Docker lab. The Java apps intentionally expose vulnerable routes, while the Python scripts operationalize exploitation over UDP/TCP/cache protocols. The code is coherent, aligned with the documented CVEs, and clearly intended as working proof-of-concept exploit material rather than mere detection.

dinosnDisclosed Apr 27, 2026markdowndockerfilenetworkweb
apache-camelMaturityPoCVerified exploit

Repository is a multi-PoC research project for three Apache Camel 4.18.0 vulnerabilities, not a framework module. Structure is split into: (1) README and exploit report documenting root cause and reproduction, (2) three Java/Maven vulnerable demo applications under poc/cve-* with Dockerfiles, (3) docker-compose.yml to launch the lab, and (4) three Python exploit scripts under poc/exploits. The CoAP PoC demonstrates unauthenticated header injection over UDP/5683 by crafting raw CoAP packets with URI query parameters that become Camel headers, overriding camel-exec command settings and returning command output. The MINA PoC demonstrates unsafe Java deserialization over TCP on ports 9877/9878/9879; the most important path is 9879 with allowDefaultCodec=false, where raw IoBuffer data is converted into ObjectInputStream without filtering. Supporting Java utilities generate MINA-compatible serialized payloads and test framing. The Python MINA exploit can use ysoserial gadget chains and starts a local HTTP listener to capture exfiltrated command output via curl from the target. The Infinispan PoC demonstrates cache poisoning against a Camel aggregation repository backed by Infinispan; the Python exploit crafts a Hot Rod PUT request to write a malicious serialized object to a predictable cache key, relying on later deserialization by Camel to trigger execution. Overall, this is a real exploit repository with operational PoCs, local lab infrastructure, and clear network targets: CoAP UDP/5683, MINA TCP/9877-9879, and Infinispan Hot Rod TCP/11222.

dinosnDisclosed Apr 27, 2026markdowndockerfilenetworkweb
EXPOSURE SURFACE

Affected products & vendors

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VendorProductType
Apache Software FoundationCamelapplication

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