TanStack GitHub Actions Trusted Publisher Supply Chain Compromise
CVE-2026-45321 is a critical supply-chain vulnerability affecting TanStack’s npm publishing pipeline. On 2026-05-11, attackers published 84 malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* packages to the npm registry within approximately six minutes. The publishes were authenticated through TanStack/router’s legitimate GitHub Actions OIDC trusted-publisher binding, and the publish workflow itself was reportedly not modified. The compromise was achieved through a chained exploitation of multiple CI/CD weaknesses: a pull_request_target workflow misconfiguration that allowed fork-controlled code to execute in the privileged context of the base repository, GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork-to-base trust boundary, and runtime extraction of the OIDC token from the Actions runner process memory. The stolen OIDC token was then exchanged through npm trusted publishing to obtain publish capability under TanStack’s legitimate identity. The resulting malicious package versions contained credential-stealing malware and, in some reporting, carried valid Sigstore/SLSA provenance because they were built and published by the legitimate release pipeline.
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Exploits
No valid public exploits. Mallory filtered out 10 candidates as fakes, detection scripts, or README-only repos.
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Recent activity
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A supply chain attack affecting TanStack npm packages where attackers abused GitHub Actions to publish numerous malicious package versions containing credential-stealing malware.
A supply chain attack on 42 @tanstack npm packages in which attackers abused GitHub Actions, cache poisoning, pull_request_target misconfiguration, and OIDC token theft to publish malicious package versions containing credential-stealing malware.
A software supply chain compromise in TanStack npm packages caused by chained exploitation of weaknesses in GitHub Actions CI/CD workflows, enabling cache poisoning, OIDC token theft, and malicious package publication.
A tracked vulnerability/abuse chain involving TanStack OIDC credentials that enabled credential harvesting and was subsequently used to publish trojanized software in the TeamPCP/Shai-Hulud supply-chain campaign.
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