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Critical

Unauthenticated RCE in Samba DCE/RPC SAMR check password script

IdentifiersCVE-2026-4408CWE-78· Improper Neutralization of Special…

CVE-2026-4408 is an unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in Samba’s DCE/RPC SAMR server logic related to password validation operations. The vulnerable path is reachable via the SAMR RPC methods SamValidatePasswordChange and SamValidatePasswordReset. In affected deployments, Samba invokes the configured "check password script" from smb.conf and, if that script uses the %u substitution character, a client-controlled username is inserted into the command line without proper escaping of shell metacharacters. This creates an OS command injection condition. The issue affects Samba file servers and classic non-AD domain controllers when samba-dcerpcd is started as a system service; the content also indicates the vulnerable path is reachable when "rpc start on demand helpers = no" is set. Active Directory Domain Controllers are not directly affected because they do not expand %u in this way.

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary shell commands on the affected Samba host. Depending on the privileges of the invoked service and local configuration, this can result in full system compromise, access to files and credentials, lateral movement, persistence, ransomware deployment, data exfiltration, and disruption of service integrity and availability.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

Do not use %u in the "check password script" configuration. Retrieve the username from the SAMBA_CPS_ACCOUNT_NAME environment variable instead. Keep "rpc start on demand helpers" at its default value of "yes" so samba-dcerpcd is started on demand rather than as a permanently running system service. Review smb.conf for use of "check password script" in file server and classic non-AD domain controller deployments, and disable or reconfigure the feature if not strictly required. Restrict external exposure of SMB/DCE-RPC services, especially TCP/445, using firewalls, VPNs, and IP allowlists.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade Samba to a fixed release. The content identifies Samba 4.22.10, 4.23.8, and 4.24.3 as patched versions, or later releases containing the fix. Apply the vendor patch if an immediate version upgrade is not possible. Rework any "check password script" configuration so it does not use the unsafe %u substitution; Samba introduced the SAMBA_CPS_ACCOUNT_NAME environment variable for safely retrieving the account name instead.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

Exploits

No public exploits tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.

VALID 0 / 0 TOTALView more in app

No public exploit code observed for this vulnerability.

EXPOSURE SURFACE

Affected products & vendors

Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.

VendorProductType
Red HatEnterprise Linuxoperating_system
Red HatOpenshift Container Platformapplication
SambaSambaapplication

Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

27 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets are affected, which adversaries are exploiting it right now, which detections to deploy, and what to do tonight.
Exposure mapping

Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.

Threat actor evidence

Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.

Associated malware

Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Vendor-by-vendor mapping

Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.

Social activity18

Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.