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Critical

Heap Use-After-Free in OpenSSL PKCS7_verify()

IdentifiersCVE-2026-45447CWE-416· Use After Free

CVE-2026-45447 is a high-severity use-after-free vulnerability in OpenSSL's PKCS#7 signature verification path. When an application processes a specially crafted PKCS#7 or S/MIME signed message via the PKCS#7 APIs, and the SignedData digestAlgorithms field is encoded as an empty ASN.1 SET, OpenSSL may incorrectly free a caller-owned BIO during PKCS7_verify(). If the application subsequently reuses or frees that BIO, a use-after-free condition occurs. In the common case, this is triggered when the caller later invokes BIO_free() on the same BIO originally passed to PKCS7_verify(). The issue affects applications using OpenSSL PKCS#7 APIs for PKCS#7 or S/MIME signed message verification; the CMS APIs are explicitly stated to be unaffected. Reported affected versions are OpenSSL 4.0.0 before 4.0.1, 3.6.0 before 3.6.3, 3.5.0 before 3.5.7, 3.4.0 before 3.4.6, 3.0.0 before 3.0.21, 1.1.1 before 1.1.1zh, and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2zq. The OpenSSL FIPS modules in 4.0, 3.6, 3.5, 3.4, and 3.0 are not affected because the vulnerable code is outside the FIPS module boundary.

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation can cause process crashes, heap corruption, and potentially remote code execution, depending on allocator behavior and how the application uses the freed BIO after PKCS7_verify() returns. At minimum, this is a denial-of-service condition in affected applications that verify attacker-supplied PKCS#7 or S/MIME signed content. In some application contexts, the memory corruption may be exploitable beyond a crash.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

Until patched, avoid processing untrusted PKCS#7 or S/MIME signed messages through the affected OpenSSL PKCS#7 verification APIs. Where operationally possible, disable or isolate PKCS#7/S/MIME verification of attacker-controlled content, or switch to the unaffected CMS APIs for equivalent processing. There is no general workaround that fully eliminates risk short of updating or avoiding the vulnerable code path.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade OpenSSL to a fixed release: 4.0.1 or later, 3.6.3 or later, 3.5.7 or later, 3.4.6 or later, 3.0.21 or later, 1.1.1zh or later, or 1.0.2zq or later, as applicable to the supported branch in use. Downstream consumers should apply vendor-supplied updates from their operating system or distribution if they do not build OpenSSL directly. If the application currently uses PKCS#7 APIs for signed-message verification, migrate that processing to the CMS APIs where feasible, as the advisory states CMS APIs are not affected.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

Exploits

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VALID 0 / 0 TOTALView more in app

No public exploit code observed for this vulnerability.

EXPOSURE SURFACE

Affected products & vendors

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FreebsdFreebsdapplication

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Associated malware

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Detection signatures

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Vendor-by-vendor mapping

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Social activity21

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