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Bleichenbacher Oracle in OpenSSL CMS_decrypt() and PKCS7_decrypt()

IdentifiersCVE-2026-42768CWE-203

CVE-2026-42768 is a low-severity Bleichenbacher-style adaptive chosen-ciphertext oracle in OpenSSL's CMS_decrypt() and PKCS7_decrypt() handling of RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 Key Transport in CMS/S/MIME messages. The issue affects OpenSSL 4.0.0 before 4.0.1, 3.6.0 before 3.6.3, 3.5.0 before 3.5.7, and 3.4.0 before 3.4.6. In one variant, when the decryption API is used without supplying the recipient certificate, OpenSSL iterates over all KeyTransRecipientInfo entries instead of stopping at the first success. An attacker can craft a message containing two KTRI entries, with one legitimate wrapped CEK and one probe ciphertext, and use application-visible error behavior to test PKCS#1 v1.5 padding validity. In the second variant, when a recipient certificate is supplied but no matching recipient is found, OpenSSL substitutes a random key; if an attacker can compare both the error code and decryption result, this also creates an oracle. The flaw arises from distinguishable decryption behavior around RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 processing, enabling Bleichenbacher-style probing against the victim's private RSA key operations.

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

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Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation can turn the victim application into an RSA decryption or signing oracle. Under the required conditions, an attacker can decrypt arbitrary RSA ciphertexts intended for the victim's private key or forge PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures using that key. Depending on application behavior, this can undermine confidentiality of encrypted CMS/S/MIME content and the integrity or authenticity guarantees associated with RSA private-key operations.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

Provide the recipient certificate when calling CMS_decrypt() or PKCS7_decrypt() to avoid ambiguous RecipientInfo processing. Do not expose distinguishable error codes, decryption success/failure signals, or decryption output differences to untrusted parties. Reduce or eliminate attacker ability to submit arbitrary CMS or S/MIME messages for decryption and observe detailed outcomes. Where possible, avoid RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 key transport in favor of safer constructions. The advisory notes that applications exposing the full remote attack conditions are believed to be unlikely.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade OpenSSL to a fixed release: 4.0.1 or later, 3.6.3 or later, 3.5.7 or later, or 3.4.6 or later, as applicable. The fix enables implicit rejection for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 Key Transport in EVP_PKEY_decrypt(), aligning behavior with the implicit rejection approach described in draft-irtf-cfrg-rsa-guidance. Applications should also provide the intended recipient certificate to CMS_decrypt() or PKCS7_decrypt() so the correct RecipientInfo is selected explicitly.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

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VALID 0 / 0 TOTALView more in app

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EXPOSURE SURFACE

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VendorProductType
FreebsdFreebsdapplication
OpenSSL Software FoundationOpensslapplication

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