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Unsafe deserialization via trusted-package matching in Spring for Apache Pulsar JsonPulsarHeaderMapper

IdentifiersCVE-2026-41732CWE-502· Deserialization of Untrusted Data

CVE-2026-41732 is a high-severity unsafe deserialization issue in Spring for Apache Pulsar affecting JsonPulsarHeaderMapper. The mapper validated type headers against configured trusted packages using a prefix-based check, so trusting a package also implicitly trusted all of its subpackages. In addition, if trusted-packages was configured as empty, the implementation fell back to trusting all packages instead of enforcing a safe default allow-list. In environments using header-based type mapping together with Jackson bean deserialization, a malicious Pulsar producer can send crafted header values that cause a consumer to deserialize unintended types, including arbitrary JDK classes with constructors or initialization behavior that may have side effects. Affected versions are 2.0.0 through 2.0.5, 1.2.0 through 1.2.17, and 1.1.0 through 1.1.17.

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

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Impact

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Successful exploitation can cause a vulnerable consumer to deserialize attacker-influenced types that should not have been permitted by the trusted-packages policy. According to the provided content, this can include arbitrary JDK classes whose constructors may perform side effects such as allocating file descriptors or spawning thread pools. Depending on the reachable gadget/type set and application behavior, the result can include compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability, including unsafe object creation, resource exhaustion, and potentially broader code-execution-adjacent deserialization impacts.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

If immediate upgrade is not possible, constrain trusted-packages as narrowly as possible, do not leave trusted-packages empty, and avoid configurations that permit broad header-driven type resolution. Restrict message production to trusted producers, isolate or authenticate Pulsar producers where possible, and apply defense-in-depth controls around deserialization and message handling on consumers until fixed versions are deployed. However, the vendor guidance in the provided content indicates upgrading is the primary corrective action.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade Spring for Apache Pulsar to a fixed release. The provided content identifies 2.0.6 as the OSS fix for the 2.0.x branch, 1.2.18 as the OSS fix for the 1.2.x branch, and 1.1.18 as a fix for the 1.1.x branch. Commercial patch releases referenced in the content include 2.0.5.1 and 1.2.17.1. Spring stated that no further mitigation steps are necessary beyond upgrading.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

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EXPOSURE SURFACE

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BroadcomSpring For Apache Pulsarapplication

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