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Mallory
MediumPublic exploit

Arbitrary kernel access in ASRock RGB Driver AsrDrv103.sys

IdentifiersCVE-2020-15368CWE-782

CVE-2020-15368 affects ASRock RGB/IO driver builds including AsrDrv103.sys and related variants such as AsrDrv106.sys, AsrDrv107.sys, AsrDrv107n.sys, AxtuDrv.sys, and AppShopDrv103.sys. The driver does not properly restrict access from user space and exposes dangerous low-level functionality through unprotected IOCTLs. The provided content specifically notes that user space can issue requests capable of manipulating privileged CPU state, demonstrated by triggering a triple fault via a request to zero CR3. Supporting context also associates this CVE with unprotected IOCTL commands that permit direct writes to arbitrary physical memory, enabling attacker-controlled kernel-level operations through a signed vendor driver.

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation allows an unprivileged local attacker to invoke highly privileged kernel and hardware operations from user mode. The documented effects include system crash/denial of service via triple fault, and the broader driver family behavior is described as enabling arbitrary physical memory writes and execution of untrusted code in kernel context. In practice, this makes the vulnerability suitable for BYOVD abuse, including disabling security controls, loading unsigned drivers, privilege escalation to kernel/SYSTEM, persistence, and full compromise of the affected host.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

Block known vulnerable ASRock drivers from loading using Microsoft vulnerable driver blocklist, WDAC/App Control policies, and EDR/AV driver-blocking features. Monitor for driver load events such as Sysmon Event ID 6 and alert on AsrDrv103.sys, AsrDrv106.sys, AsrDrv107.sys, AsrDrv107n.sys, AxtuDrv.sys, and AppShopDrv103.sys. Restrict administrative ability to install/start kernel services, and investigate any use of tools or tradecraft associated with BYOVD or unsigned driver loading. Splunk guidance in the content also recommends validating detections by driver version, signer, and file path.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Update or remove vulnerable ASRock driver packages and utilities that install the affected AsrDrv*.sys family, including ASRock Motherboard Utility versions 3.0.498 and below referenced in the content. Replace them with vendor-fixed builds if available. Prevent loading of known vulnerable hashes and filenames through enterprise driver block rules and application control. If the software is not required, uninstall the associated ASRock utilities and delete the vulnerable driver from systems.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

Exploits

2 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos.

VALID 2 / 2 TOTALView more in app
asrockploitMaturityPoCVerified exploit

This repository contains a local privilege escalation exploit for CVE-2020-15368, targeting the vulnerable ASRock AsrDrv107 driver on Windows. The exploit is implemented in C++ and consists of two main components: a user-mode launcher (AsrockPloit) and a custom kernel-mode payload (DummyDriver). The exploit works by opening a handle to the vulnerable driver (\\.\GlobalRoot\Device\AsrDrv107), crafting and encrypting IOCTL commands to read/write physical memory and control registers, and ultimately mapping and executing a custom driver (DummyDriver) in kernel space. The exploit also interacts with the Beep device (\\.\GlobalRoot\Device\Beep) to facilitate code injection. The repository includes code for parsing PDB symbols to resolve kernel function addresses, and uses a compile-time string encryption library for obfuscation. The exploit provides full kernel code execution, allowing for arbitrary actions at the highest privilege level. The structure is typical for a Windows kernel exploit: project files for Visual Studio, headers for driver communication and cryptography, and main logic in entry.cpp files for both user and kernel components.

R7flexDisclosed Aug 10, 2024c++local
CVE-2020-15368MaturityPoCVerified exploit

This repository provides a full exploit and proof-of-concept for CVE-2020-15368, a vulnerability in the Asrock repackaged RWEverything driver (AsrDrv104) for Windows. The exploit consists of two main components: a custom kernel driver (MyDriver1) and a user-mode exploit (exploit.cpp). The exploit leverages the vulnerable driver's IOCTL interface, which is protected by weak encryption, to achieve arbitrary kernel memory read/write and ultimately execute arbitrary code in kernel mode. The exploit works by scanning physical memory for the driver's code, patching it to redirect execution to custom shellcode, and then restoring the original code to avoid system instability. The payload spawns a new kernel thread, allowing for privilege escalation and further kernel-level actions. The repository is structured as a Visual Studio solution with separate projects for the exploit and the custom driver. The main entry point is 'exploit/exploit.cpp', which orchestrates the attack. The exploit targets local Windows systems with the vulnerable driver installed and requires administrative privileges to interact with the device. No network endpoints are involved; all attack vectors are local. The exploit is operational and provides a working privilege escalation method for affected systems.

stongDisclosed Jun 29, 2021c++local
EXPOSURE SURFACE

Affected products & vendors

Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.

VendorProductType
AsrockRgb Driver Firmwareoperating_system

Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.

What this page doesn’t show

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Exposure mapping

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Threat actor evidence

Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.

Associated malware3

Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.

Detection signatures

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Vendor-by-vendor mapping

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Social activity1

Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.