Skip to main content
Meet us at Black Hat USA 2026— Las Vegas, August 1–6Book a Meeting
Mallory
HighCISA KEVExploited in the wildPublic exploit

Authentication Bypass in Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure Web Component

IdentifiersCVE-2023-46805CWE-288

CVE-2023-46805 is an authentication bypass vulnerability in the web component of Ivanti Connect Secure (ICS, formerly Pulse Connect Secure) 9.x and 22.x and Ivanti Policy Secure. The flaw allows a remote attacker to bypass control checks and access restricted resources. The provided context consistently characterizes the issue as affecting the web component and enabling access to protected endpoints without valid authentication. Multiple sources in the context note that this vulnerability was widely chained with CVE-2024-21887, a command injection flaw, to achieve unauthenticated remote code execution against exposed Ivanti VPN appliances during active exploitation observed from December 2023 into January 2024.

Share:
For your environment

Are you exposed to this one?

Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.

ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

On its own, the vulnerability allows unauthorized access to restricted resources on affected Ivanti gateways by bypassing authentication and authorization checks. In real-world intrusions, the flaw was commonly used as the first stage of an exploit chain with CVE-2024-21887, enabling unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary commands on the appliance. The broader operational impact described in the context includes compromise of VPN gateways, web shell deployment, credential harvesting from the appliance, lateral movement into internal Windows domain environments, and in some cases full domain compromise. The vulnerability was actively exploited in the wild and associated with large-scale compromise of exposed Ivanti devices across multiple sectors.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

If immediate patching is not possible, apply Ivanti’s interim mitigation guidance for the affected gateways and reduce exposure of management and web interfaces from untrusted networks. Monitor for exploitation attempts and suspicious access to vulnerable web endpoints, including anomalous requests to bookmark and configuration-related paths referenced in detection content. Forward and review appliance logs, inspect for web shells and filesystem modifications, and use available IOCs and YARA rules from Ivanti, Volexity, CISA, and partner advisories. Because the context notes that some attackers cleared logs, restored files, and bypassed earlier mitigations, mitigations alone should not be treated as proof of safety; defenders should assume possible credential compromise and investigate accordingly.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Apply Ivanti vendor patches for affected Ivanti Connect Secure 9.x/22.x and Ivanti Policy Secure versions as provided by Ivanti. Because the context indicates a patch gap existed during early exploitation and that attackers developed bypasses to initial mitigations, organizations should ensure they are running the latest vendor-supported fixed release and follow Ivanti’s current advisory guidance. Given reporting that compromise may persist and that credentials stored on affected appliances may have been exposed, remediation should also include incident response actions where compromise is suspected: run the latest Ivanti Integrity Checker Tool and other forensic validation steps, rotate credentials associated with the appliance, and rebuild or replace affected systems if compromise is confirmed or cannot be ruled out.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

Exploits

2 valid exploits after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (4 hidden).

VALID 2 / 6 TOTALView more in app
abyss-c2MaturityPoCVerified exploit

This repository is a multi-module Python offensive framework centered on exploiting HiSilicon DVR/NVR/IP camera devices via CVE-2020-25078, then managing compromised hosts through a Flask/SocketIO web panel. It is not a simple single-file PoC: it includes a control server (server.py), persistence and post-exploitation tooling, credential attacks, recon modules, web vulnerability scanners, network service checks, pivoting, reverse shell support, and a SQLite-backed datastore. Core exploit logic is in exploit.py and scanner.py. exploit.py probes numerous traversal/disclosure paths such as /../../.../mnt/mtd/Config/Account1 and related config/system files, parses returned content with multiple regex patterns to recover credentials, fingerprints device families, and falls back to known default credentials when disclosure succeeds but parsing does not. scanner.py operationalizes this by scanning IPs/CIDRs and common ports, checking liveness, fingerprinting likely cameras, invoking the CVE-2020-25078 checks, and storing recovered credentials in cameras.db. Post-exploitation capability is substantial. telnet_client.py provides raw Telnet login and command execution. botnet.py fans out commands across stored hosts. persistence.py installs SSH authorized_keys, cron, rc.local, init.d, systemd, inittab telnetd, and bind-shell style persistence. reverse_shell.py generates many Linux/IoT reverse shell one-liners and runs listeners. pivot_chain.py and socks_pivot.py support chained execution and local SOCKS5 pivoting through compromised hosts. Additional modules broaden scope beyond the HiSilicon exploit: brute.py and cred_spray.py perform credential attacks across Telnet, SSH, FTP, HTTP, SMB, databases, VNC, LDAP, WinRM, and more; network_exploit.py checks for exposed/misconfigured services and some well-known vulnerabilities such as MS17-010 and BlueKeep; web_exploit.py, web_cves.py, web_bugs.py, and web_brute.py scan websites for exposed files, CMS fingerprints, generic bug classes, and multiple CVE signatures. Recon/intel support includes ASN, DNS, GeoIP, JARM, WAF detection, proxy/Tor rotation, screenshot grabbing from camera snapshot endpoints, and Telegram/Discord/AbuseIPDB integrations. The repository structure is coherent and functional, with many CLI-capable modules and a central web UI in templates/index.html. Overall, this is an operational exploit-and-post-exploitation toolkit focused on HiSilicon IoT devices but expanded into a broader C2-style offensive platform.

flags-altDisclosed May 20, 2026pythonhtmlnetworkweblocal
CVE-2023-46805_CVE-2024-21887MaturityPoCVerified exploit

This repository provides two Bash proof-of-concept exploit scripts targeting Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure appliances (versions 9.x and 22.x) for CVE-2023-46805 (authentication bypass) and CVE-2024-21887 (command injection). The structure consists of two shell scripts and a detailed README. - CVE-2023-46805.sh exploits an authentication bypass by sending a crafted GET request to a system information endpoint, allowing unauthenticated access to restricted data. - CVE-2024-21887.sh exploits a command injection vulnerability by injecting a user-supplied command (URL-encoded) into a specific API endpoint, allowing an authenticated administrator to execute arbitrary commands on the appliance. The README provides usage instructions, example endpoints, and additional API paths that may be of interest for further exploitation or post-exploitation activities. The scripts require standard Unix utilities (curl, json_pp, xxd, tr, sed) and are intended for use in a command-line environment. No hardcoded IPs or credentials are present; the user supplies the target URL and, for the command injection, the payload command. The attack vector is network-based, targeting exposed web interfaces of vulnerable Ivanti appliances.

duy-31Disclosed Jan 16, 2024bashmarkdownnetwork
EXPOSURE SURFACE

Affected products & vendors

Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.

VendorProductType
IvantiConnect Secureapplication
IvantiPolicy Secureapplication

Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets are affected, which adversaries are exploiting it right now, which detections to deploy, and what to do tonight.
Exposure mapping

Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.

Threat actor evidence21

Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.

Associated malware24

Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.

Detection signatures2

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Vendor-by-vendor mapping

Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.

Social activity8

Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.