Skip to main content
Meet us at Black Hat USA 2026— Las Vegas, August 1–6Book a Meeting
Mallory
Low

Bleichenbacher Oracle in OpenSSL CMS_decrypt() and PKCS7_decrypt()

IdentifiersCVE-2026-42768CWE-203

CVE-2026-42768 is a low-severity Bleichenbacher-style adaptive chosen-ciphertext oracle in OpenSSL's CMS_decrypt() and PKCS7_decrypt() functions when processing CMS or S/MIME messages that use RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 Key Transport. The issue affects OpenSSL 4.0.0 before 4.0.1, 3.6.0 before 3.6.3, 3.5.0 before 3.5.7, and 3.4.0 before 3.4.6. In one variant, when the decryption API is used without supplying the recipient certificate, OpenSSL iterates over all KeyTransRecipientInfo entries instead of stopping at the first success. An attacker can craft a message containing two KTRI entries, with one valid wrapped CEK and one attacker-controlled probe ciphertext, and use distinguishable error behavior to test PKCS#1 v1.5 padding validity. In the second variant, when a recipient certificate is supplied but no matching recipient is found, OpenSSL substitutes a random key; if an attacker can compare both the error code and decryption result, this also creates an oracle condition. The flaw arises from observable differences in error handling and decryption behavior during RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 key transport processing.

Share:
For your environment

Are you exposed to this one?

Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.

ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation turns the victim application into a Bleichenbacher oracle for the victim's RSA private key operations. Under the required conditions, an attacker can decrypt arbitrary RSA ciphertexts intended for the victim or forge PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures using the victim's private RSA key. In practice, this can undermine confidentiality of encrypted CMS/S/MIME content and enable unauthorized signing operations. OpenSSL assessed the issue as low severity because applications exposing the necessary attacker-observable conditions are believed to be uncommon, especially for remote exploitation.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

Always provide the recipient certificate when calling CMS_decrypt() or PKCS7_decrypt() to identify the intended RecipientInfo. Avoid exposing distinguishable error codes, decryption success/failure differences, or decrypted output to attacker-controlled inputs. More generally, do not allow attackers to submit arbitrary CMS/S/MIME messages to a decryption service where they can observe detailed error behavior or compare output across attempts. Where possible, avoid RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 key transport in favor of safer constructions.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade OpenSSL to a fixed release: 4.0.1 or later, 3.6.3 or later, 3.5.7 or later, or 3.4.6 or later, as applicable. The fix enables implicit rejection for RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 Key Transport in the invoked EVP_PKEY_decrypt(), following the CFRG RSA guidance, instead of explicitly disabling that protection. Applications should also provide the intended recipient certificate to CMS_decrypt() or PKCS7_decrypt() so the correct RecipientInfo is selected explicitly rather than relying on iteration across recipients.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

Exploits

No public exploits tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.

VALID 0 / 0 TOTALView more in app

No public exploit code observed for this vulnerability.

EXPOSURE SURFACE

Affected products & vendors

Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.

VendorProductType
FreebsdFreebsdapplication
OpenSSL Software FoundationOpensslapplication

Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets are affected, which adversaries are exploiting it right now, which detections to deploy, and what to do tonight.
Exposure mapping

Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.

Threat actor evidence

Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.

Associated malware

Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Vendor-by-vendor mapping

Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.

Social activity15

Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.