Skip to main content
Meet us at Black Hat USA 2026— Las Vegas, August 1–6Book a Meeting
Mallory
High

Use-after-free / type confusion in Linux kernel SCTP SCTP_SENDALL path

IdentifiersCVE-2026-46227CWE-416· Use After Free

CVE-2026-46227 is a flaw in the Linux kernel SCTP implementation, specifically in the SCTP_SENDALL path of sctp_sendmsg(). The code iterates endpoint associations in ep->asocs using list_for_each_entry_safe(), which caches the next list element in a temporary cursor before the loop body executes. During iteration, sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() can drop the socket lock inside sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(). While that lock is released, another thread can peel off the cached next association via SCTP_SOCKOPT_PEELOFF, causing sctp_sock_migrate() to remove it from the current endpoint list and attach it to a new endpoint list, and the migrated association may then be freed if the new socket is closed. The cached next pointer may also be freed by a network ABORT processed in softirq while the lock is dropped. Although the current association is revalidated after relocking using checks on asoc->base.sk and asoc->base.dead, the cached next cursor was not revalidated. As a result, iteration can advance to a stale pointer, causing either a use-after-free or a walk onto a different endpoint's list head, producing type confusion by treating &newep->asocs as a struct sctp_association *. The upstream fix re-derives the next iterator cursor from the current association after sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() returns.

Share:
For your environment

Are you exposed to this one?

Mallory correlates every CVE against your assets, your vendors, and active adversary campaigns. Know which vulnerabilities matter for you, not just which ones are loud.

ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

What it means. What to do now. Patch path, mitigations, and the assume-compromise checklist.

Impact

What an attacker gets, and what they’ve been doing with it.

Successful exploitation can trigger kernel-memory safety violations in SCTP handling, resulting in either use-after-free or type confusion in kernel context. The advisory states both paths are reachable from CapEff=0, and the type-confusion path can yield a controlled indirect call through outqueue.sched->init_sid. Impact therefore includes potential kernel crash/denial of service, memory corruption, and possible privilege escalation or arbitrary code execution in kernel context, with high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

If immediate patching is not possible, reduce exposure by disabling or unloading SCTP support where operationally feasible, and restrict the ability of untrusted local users or containers to create and manipulate SCTP sockets. Minimize access to SCTP features such as peeloff operations, and use kernel hardening and least-privilege controls to limit local attack surface. These are temporary risk-reduction measures only; the definitive mitigation is to install a fixed kernel.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Update to a Linux kernel release containing the upstream fix for CVE-2026-46227. The fix changes the SCTP_SENDALL iteration logic to re-derive the temporary next cursor from the current association after sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc() returns, rather than relying on a potentially stale cached pointer across a lock drop. Apply vendor-supplied kernel updates from your distribution; the provided content indicates fixes were shipped by SUSE in multiple 2026-06 advisories, including openSUSE Tumbleweed and several SLE 15 SP4/SP5/SP6 product lines.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

Exploits

No public exploits tracked yet. Mallory keeps watching.

VALID 0 / 0 TOTALView more in app

No public exploit code observed for this vulnerability.

EXPOSURE SURFACE

Affected products & vendors

Products and vendors Mallory has correlated with this vulnerability. Open in Mallory to drill down to specific CPE configurations and version ranges.

VendorProductType
LinuxLinux Kerneloperating_system

Vendor-confirmed product mapping. Mallory continuously reconciles this list against your asset inventory.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets are affected, which adversaries are exploiting it right now, which detections to deploy, and what to do tonight.
Exposure mapping

Query your assets running an affected version, and investigate the blast radius.

Threat actor evidence

Every observed campaign linking this CVE to a named adversary.

Associated malware

Malware families riding this exploit, with evidence and IOCs.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Vendor-by-vendor mapping

Cross-references every affected SKU, including bundled OEM variants.

Social activity

Community discussion across Reddit, Mastodon, and other social sources.