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UnratedPublic exploit

HTTP/2 memory exhaustion in Envoy via cookie header size bypass and HPACK amplification

IdentifiersCVE-2026-47774CWE-770

CVE-2026-47774 is a denial-of-service vulnerability in Envoy's downstream HTTP/2 request processing affecting versions prior to 1.35.11, 1.36.7, 1.37.3, and 1.38.1. The flaw results from the interaction of two behaviors: Envoy does not fully account for cookie header bytes during request header size validation, and the underlying oghttp2/quiche HPACK header block limits are enforced on encoded header bytes without an equivalent bound on the total decoded header size. An unauthenticated remote client can therefore send compact HPACK-encoded header blocks, including repeated indexed cookie references, that expand into much larger decoded headers in memory while bypassing intended request-header size protections. Under concurrency, this can force large per-stream allocations, and flow-control stalling can prolong stream lifetime and delay memory reclamation, increasing memory pressure until the Envoy process is OOM-killed.

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ANALYST BRIEF

Impact, mitigation & remediation

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Impact

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Successful exploitation allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause excessive memory consumption in Envoy, potentially leading to out-of-memory termination of the proxy process and denial of service. The issue can also cause oversized decoded cookies to be forwarded upstream, which may exceed upstream header limits and trigger HTTP/2 connection resets and transient request failures. The primary impact is availability loss rather than code execution or privilege escalation.

Mitigation

If you can’t patch tonight, do this now.

If immediate patching is not possible, temporary mitigations include disabling downstream HTTP/2 where operationally feasible; enforcing stricter request-header and cookie limits before traffic reaches Envoy, such as at a fronting load balancer or gateway; and closely monitoring Envoy memory usage for abnormal growth under HTTP/2 traffic. Indicators of exploitation include unusual HTTP/2 traffic with repeated indexed cookie references, abnormal memory growth, and OOM termination events such as exit status 137.

Remediation

Patch, then assume compromise.

Upgrade Envoy to a fixed release: 1.35.11, 1.36.7, 1.37.3, 1.38.1, or later. These versions contain the vendor fix for the downstream HTTP/2 header processing issue. Because the vendor states no complete workaround is known short of applying the fix, patching should be treated as the definitive remediation.
PUBLIC EXPLOITS

Exploits

1 valid exploit after Mallory filtered fakes, detection scripts, and README-only repos (1 hidden).

VALID 1 / 2 TOTALView more in app
CVE-2026-49975MaturityPoCVerified exploit

Repository contains a Python proof-of-concept exploit for an HTTP/2 denial-of-service issue described as CVE-2026-49975, plus a companion defense-probing script and a local HTTP/2 test server. The main exploit file is http2_bomb.py, which manually builds HTTP/2 traffic using hyperframe and hpack rather than a higher-level HTTP client. It opens a TCP/TLS connection to a user-supplied host and port, negotiates ALPN 'h2' when TLS is enabled, sends the HTTP/2 connection preface and SETTINGS, and then performs the attack by abusing HPACK compression and HTTP/2 flow control. The exploit’s core capability is to insert small headers into the HPACK dynamic table and then send many indexed references across multiple streams, creating asymmetric server-side memory/bookkeeping cost. It also sets INITIAL_WINDOW_SIZE to 0 to inhibit response delivery and can periodically send WINDOW_UPDATE frames to keep the connection alive, effectively pinning allocations. Optional cookie fragmentation is included to try to bypass header-count limits. probe_defense.py is not the exploit itself; it is a detection/probing utility that connects to a target HTTP/2 service and evaluates whether mitigations appear present based on protocol behavior. test_server.py is a local vulnerable-style HTTP/2 server used for validation and demonstration; it listens with TLS, accepts HTTP/2 connections, decodes headers, and logs large header counts to simulate the vulnerable processing path. Repository structure is small and focused: 3 Python code files, 1 README, 1 requirements file, and .gitignore. Dependencies are h2/hpack/hyperframe. This is a real exploit repository, not just documentation, and its practical outcome is application-layer remote DoS rather than code execution. No hardcoded victim infrastructure is embedded; the operator supplies the target host and port at runtime.

LiaoZiqi-GZFLSDisclosed Jun 10, 2026pythonmarkdownnetwork
ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

8 sources tracked across advisories and community write-ups. News coverage will land here when it surfaces.

No news coverage yet. Advisories and community discussion only.

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