APT33
APT33 is an Iranian state-sponsored threat actor assessed in the provided content as operating under the control of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Known aliases include Elfin, Holmium, G0064, Peach Sandstorm, and Refined Kitten. The group has been described as likely sponsored by the Iranian government and as a well-documented IRGC-affiliated APT. The content links APT33 to espionage-focused targeting of aerospace, aviation, and energy organizations, including a compromised U.S. aerospace organization and additional aviation and energy entities in Saudi Arabia and South Korea. Other reporting in the content states that Elfin/APT33 attacked at least 50 organizations and targeted government and private-sector entities in sectors including chemical, engineering, research, finance, telecoms, healthcare, manufacturing, IT, consulting, and energy consultancy, with significant victimization in Saudi Arabia and the United States. One report also states that Microsoft-linked reporting on Holmium/APT33 described campaigns against oil-and-gas firms and heavy machinery manufacturers across Saudi Arabia, Germany, the United Kingdom, India, and the United States. Observed tradecraft in the content includes spearphishing emails with archive or other malicious attachments, including job-themed lures and fake recruitment websites spoofing companies such as Boeing and Northrop Grumman Aviation Arabia. APT33 used PowerShell to download files from command-and-control servers and run scripts, used HTTP for command and control, and used Base64 to encode command-and-control traffic and payloads. The group has leveraged publicly available tools for early intrusion activity and credential access, including LaZagne. The content also states that APT33 used compromised Office 365 accounts together with Ruler in attempts to gain control of endpoints. For persistence, the content states that APT33 deployed DarkComet to the Startup folder and used Registry Run keys, and also created a scheduled task to execute a .vbe file multiple times per day. Symantec reporting in the content describes Elfin/APT33 using POSHC2, Quasar RAT, DarkComet, Remcos, Pupy RAT, NanoCore, NetWeird, Mimikatz, Gpppassword, and SniffPass, as well as custom malware including Notestuk/TURNEDUP, Stonedrill, and a custom AutoIt backdoor. The content also notes an attempted exploitation of CVE-2018-20250 in WinRAR against a Saudi chemical-sector target. The content associates APT33 with malware loaders capable of delivering wiping tools and notes links to destructive malware, but also states that FireEye had not directly observed APT33 using a Shamoon-like wiper. Symantec likewise stated it found no further evidence that Elfin was responsible for the Shamoon attacks discussed in that reporting.
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Targeting
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Who they target
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
- Energy
- Software & Services
- Government & Administration
- Academia & Research
- Military
Where they target
Geographies tied to known operations.
- 🇺🇸 United States
- 🇦🇪 United Arab Emirates
- 🇦🇺 Australia
Where they're from
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
- IR
Tradecraft
57 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
29 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
24 additional families tracked in Mallory.
Associated vulnerabilities
4 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 4 of them exploited in the wild.
APT33 has used a publicly available exploit for CVE-2017-0213 to escalate privileges on a local system.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
In a recent wave of attacks during February 2019, Elfin attempted to exploit a known vulnerability (CVE-2018-20250) in WinRAR... If successfully exploited on an unpatched computer, the vulnerability could permit an attacker to install any file on the computer, which effectively permits code execution on the targeted computer.
Peach Sandstorm also attempted to exploit vulnerabilities with a public proof-of-concept (POC) in Zoho ManageEngine or Confluence, to access targets’ environments. CVE-2022-47966 is a remote code execution vulnerability affecting a subset of on-premises Zoho ManageEngine products. Microsoft recommends organizations using vulnerable applications patch this vulnerability as multiple groups have been observed exploiting this vulnerability.
Observables
47 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
Recent activity
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed in the detection annotations as a threat actor associated with exploitation for privilege escalation.
Iranian state-sponsored espionage and reconnaissance actor targeting Chinese energy infrastructure and other critical sectors, using long dwell times and custom malware for persistence and intelligence collection.
Listed as a threat actor associated with the PowerShell P/Invoke process injection API chain detection and related ATT&CK techniques.
Listed as a threat actor associated with PowerShell execution behavior relevant to this detection analytic.
The version that knows your environment.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.